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Federalism was our Nation's own discovery. The Fram-
ers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their
idea that our citizens would have two political capacities,
one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by
the other. The resulting Constitution created a legal sys-
tem unprecedented in form and design, establishing two
orders of governments, each with its own direct relation-
ship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and
obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed
by it.'
Federalism created "dual delegated sovereign powers."
2 
"Judi-
* J.D., Washington and Lee University School of Law, 1982; B.A.,
University of Rhode Island, 1979. Mr. Bender is a partner in the firm Hanson
Curran LLP in Providence, RI, where he practices appellate litigation. Por-
tions of this article appear with some alterations in Thomas R. Bender,
Rhode Island's Public Importance Exception for Advisory Opinions: The Un-
constitutional Exercise of a Non-Judicial Power, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 123 (2004). These excerpts are reprinted with permission.
1. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring).
2. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 150 (1996) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing).
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cial federalism" refers to the sovereign power of the United States
Supreme Court to interpret and apply the federal Constitution's
Bill of Rights, and the distinct sovereign power of state supreme
courts to interpret and apply the state analog of those rights in
their own state constitutions.3 Distinct sovereignty means a state
supreme court is entitled to independently interpret its constitu-
tion based upon its unique text and history, or the state's unique
attitudes towards certain constitutional protections. 4 Perhaps
more importantly, it means that even where there are no unique
state sources, state supreme courts may take full advantage of
federalism by making their own considered judgments concerning
the appropriate meaning of shared constitutional text, and
thereby contribute to the national dialogue on the meaning of con-
stitutionally protected liberties.5
This article explores the opportunity and obligation bestowed
upon state supreme courts by judicial federalism, and inquires
whether the Rhode Island Supreme Court has taken advantage of
the federalist model to: (1) give the Declaration of Rights in Article
I of the Rhode Island Constitution independent vitality and mean-
ing for the people of this state; and (2) add its voice and considered
views to the nation's constitutional discourse. This article suggests
that the Rhode Island Supreme Court has not taken full advan-
tage of judicial federalism, and that the court, in interpreting the
Declaration of Rights, has instead adopted a philosophy of reflex-
ive deference to decisions of the United States Supreme Court in-
terpreting corresponding rights in the federal Bill of Rights. To
borrow a phrase from Justice David Souter, the result has been to
reduce the Rhode Island Declaration of Rights to a "mere row of
shadows" alongside the federal Bill of Rights,6 and to effectively
cede to the United States Supreme Court the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court's own sovereign authority to determine state consti-
tutional meaning. This article advocates that the Rhode Island
3. See Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continu-ing Methodology and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State Constitu-
tional Rights Adjudication, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015, 1015-16 (1997).4. See Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and
the New Judicial Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 101-02 (2000); see
also City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982).
5. See Friedman, supra note 4, at 100-01.
6. State v. Bradberry, 522 A.2d 1380, 1389 (N.H. 1986) (Souter, J., con-
curring).
STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM
Supreme Court take a more active and vigorous role in investigat-
ing unique sources that may give insight as to the intended mean-
ing of state constitutional protections. Where there are none, the
court must fully exercise the opportunity - and even the obligation
- to become an active and independent participant in the national
debate over what our constitutional protections should be, and
then give them independent force in this state. The court should
do so both as a matter of federalism, and to honor Rhode Island's
state constitutional history and the present command of article 1,
section 24, declaring "[tihe rights guaranteed by this Constitution
are not dependent on those guaranteed by the Constitution of the
United States."7
This obligation is not the state supreme court's alone. The re-
sponsibility for a more vigorous state constitutionalism is shared
by the state bar; in fact, it must start with the bar. For the court
to adequately investigate Rhode Island's unique state constitution,
or effectively participate in the national constitutional dialogue on
fundamental rights, the bar must do both as well. Consequently,
the call of this article is for both the bench and the bar to change
the way they think about state constitutionalism. For the bar, this
involves a commitment to assert, analyze and argue constitutional
claims using the state constitution as the rights-creating docu-
ment. It involves a commitment to advocating that the court de-
cide state constitutional issues before federal ones, and that it
critically examine federal constitutional precedent before attach-
ing its meaning to our state constitution. For the bench, it involves
7. This article's critique is not aimed at the Rhode Island Supreme
Court's investigation and analysis of state constitutional protections when
presented with a claim based solely on the state constitution. It is directed at
the court's approach in cases involving both federal and state claims under
analogous, but distinct, provisions of the federal and state constitutions.
When faced with only a state constitutional claim the court has shown itself
quite willing and capable of vigorously examining the sources and history, as
well as competing strands of constitutional philosophy, relevant to the consti-
tutional provision at issue. See, e.g., Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031 (R.I.
2004) (right to keep and bear arms); Almond v. R.I. Lottery Comm'n, 756
A.2d 186 (R.I. 2000) (separation of powers); In re Advisory Opinion to the
Governor (Ethics Commission), 732 A.2d 55 (R.I. 1999) (separation of pow-
ers); Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580 (R.I. 1998) (art. 1, section 23 - Victims
Rights amendment). The suggestion here is that the court has a responsibil-
ity and obligation to engage in that same vigorous investigation of state con-
stitutional meaning even where an analogous federal claim is brought.
6232005]
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a commitment to addressing state constitutional claims first when
both federal and state claims are made; to independently and
critically examining the merits of constitutional positions taken by
other courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court; and to using its
sovereign power to give meaning and content to Rhode Island's
foundational state document, thereby adding its voice to the na-
tional discourse on constitutional matters. In sum, the bar must
recognize the Rhode Island Constitution as the primary repository
of individual liberties and protections, and the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court must assert its role as the primary guardian of those
rights with the non-delegable responsibility to define them.
Part I of this article explores basic notions underlying judicial
federalism. Part II describes two analytical approaches that state
courts have taken to state constitutional interpretation, including
how those courts have utilized these approaches, the fundamental
differences between them and which approach takes full advan-
tage of the opportunity and obligations of federalism. Part III ex-
amines the development of the Rhode Island Constitution and the
Rhode Island Supreme Court's role as guardian of state constitu-
tional rights. Part IV argues that the rights in article I of the
Rhode Island Constitution, the state Declaration of Rights with
analogs in the United States Constitution's Bill of Rights, have
been reduced to a "mere row of shadows" of their federal counter-
parts. The article concludes by suggesting it is the responsibility
and the obligation of both the bench and bar to more vigorously
and independently examine the contours and protections of the
fundamental rights in the Rhode Island Constitution.
To begin, it is important to examine and understand the op-
portunity presented by judicial federalism, and how state supreme
courts have generally responded to this opportunity.
I. BAsic NOTIONS OF JuDIcIAL FEDERALISM
"State power is a vital element in federalism's design," 8 be-
cause by giving state and national governments powers allowing
each to monitor and check the abuses of the other, federalism pro-
tects liberty. In The Federalist No. 51, James Madison observed
8. James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to Na-
tional Power: Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J.
1003, 1010 (2003).
STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM
that "[iin the compound republic of America, the power surren-
dered by the people is divided between two distinct govern-
ments .... Hence a double security arises to the rights of the
people."9 In their state constitution, the people of a state are free
to subject their government to more or fewer restrictions than the
federal Constitution imposes on the national government. 10 They
may create a state bill of rights establishing a more extensive - or
even a less extensive - set of rights, privileges and liberties defin-
ing the scope of the state's power over the individual than does the
federal Bill of Rights." "The genius of federalism is that the fun-
damental rights of citizens are protected not only by the United
States Constitution but also by [state constitutions]."12 "State con-
stitutions allow the people of each state to choose their own theory
of government and of law, within what the nation requires, to take
responsibility for their own liberties, not only in courts but in the
daily practice of government." 13 They are foundational documents
where the people of a state "record their moral values, their defini-
tion of justice, [and] their hopes for the common good." 14 Critical
examination, interpretation and application of these documents
"lead all of us to face closer to home some fundamental values that
the public has become accustomed to have decided for them by the
faraway oracles in the marble temple."15
It is the sole responsibility of the United States Supreme
Court to interpret and apply the Bill of Rights and its fundamen-
tal protections restraining the federal government's power over
the individual, and to determine which of those federal constitu-
tional rights also restrain state governments. 16 The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment declares that no state shall
9. Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 14 (Tex. 1992) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (em-
phasis added)).
10. Gardner, supra note 7, at 1016.
11. Id.
12. State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 800 (N.J. 1990).
13. Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus - Constitutional Theory and State Courts,
18 GA. L. REV. 165, 199 (1984).
14. A. E. Dick Howard, The Renaissance of State Constitutional Law, 1
EMERGING ISSUES IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1, 14 (1988).
15. Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering The States' Bills of
Rights, 9 U. BALIT. L. REV. 379, 395 (1980).
16. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due proc-
ess of law."17 Liberty has been understood to have a substantive
aspect barring certain government actions.' 8 It is comprised of
rights deemed fundamental and protected from invasion by the
states. 19 "The most familiar of the substantive liberties protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment are those [expressly] recognized by
the Bill of Rights,"20 and the U.S. Supreme Court has held that
the Due Process Clause incorporates most of the Bill of Rights as
limitations on state action as well.21 For example, the Court has
held that the Due Process Clause incorporates the following fed-
eral rights of individuals against the states: the Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury in criminal cases;22 the right to compensation
for property taken by the state;23 the rights of speech, press and
religion covered by the First Amendment; 24 the Fourth Amend-
ment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures; 25
the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination;26 and the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, 27 to a
speedy trial, 28 to a public trial,29 to confrontation of opposing wit-
nesses, 30 and to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses. 31 The
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
19. Id. at 847.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
23. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148 (citing Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
24. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148. (citing Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 387(1927)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
25. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
26. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148 (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8(1964)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
27. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
342-45 (1963)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
28. Id. (citing Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967)); see
also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
29. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148 (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271-72
(1948)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
30. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148 (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403
(1965)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
31. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148 (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23
(1967)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM
Court has also held that under the "substantive due process" doc-
trine, the Due Process Clause protects certain unenumerated
rights as well.32 For example, it provides a sphere of liberty for
personal decisions "relating to marriage, procreation, contracep-
tion, family relationships, child rearing, and education."33
State constitutions may also contain declarations of rights re-
straining state government which parallel the federal Bill of
Rights and the Due Process Clause. Interpreting their content is
the sole responsibility of state supreme courts, and the U.S. Su-
preme Court has acknowledged that "[iut is fundamental that state
courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state
constitutions."34 "[A] state court is entirely free to read its own
State's constitution more broadly than [the United States Su-
preme] Court reads the Federal Constitution, or [even] to reject
the mode of analysis used by [the Supreme] Court in favor of a dif-
ferent analysis of its corresponding constitutional guarantee."35
Federalism permits states to adopt more expansive individual lib-
erties in their own constitutions,36 and state supreme court judges
have the power and responsibility to determine if they have.37
That power and responsibility is not a duty that can or should
be delegated to the United States Supreme Court.38 State supreme
court judges take oaths to support and uphold their state constitu-
tions faithfully and diligently, and are therefore obliged to faith-
fully and diligently apply them.39 "[S]tate constitutions have their
own unique origins, history, language, and structure - all of which
warrant independent attention and elucidation."40 Because "[s]tate
courts remain primarily responsible for reviewing the conduct of
their own executive branches, for safeguarding the rights of their
32. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 2011 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
33. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (citing Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
34. Minnesota v. Nat'l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940).
35. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982).
36. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
37. See Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. at 293.
38. See People v. Mitchell, 650 N.E.2d 1014, 1025 (Ill. 1995) (Heiple, J.,
dissenting).
39. See State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 751 (La. 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-
3-1(a) (1997).
40. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 707 (1986) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
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citizenry, and for nurturing the jurisprudence of state constitu-
tional rights which it is their exclusive province to expound,"41
they must decide what their state constitutions mean.
These principles are widely and generally accepted. The cru-
cial question in state courts today, however, is no longer "Whether
to give independent attention to state constitutional issues, but
how."42 One commentator has opined that "under what circum-
stances[] it is legitimate for state courts to reach conclusions un-
der their state constitutions that are more protective of rights
than United States Supreme Court decisions is one of the most
important questions of American constitutional federalism."43
II. ANALYTICAL APPROACHES TO STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
The two predominant analytical approaches to state constitu-
tional interpretation used by state supreme courts today are the
"primacy" approach and the "supplemental," or "interstitial," ap-
proach.44 The distinction between the two arises out of differing
views of judicial federalism. Specifically, differing views on the de-
gree of deference to be accorded decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court, and on the value of a state supreme court adding its
perspective and voice to the national constitutional dialogue.45
A. The Supplemental Approach
The "supplemental," or "interstitial," approach to state consti-
tutionalism has a diminished view of the value of constitutional
discourse and a more singular and hierarchical view of the state
and federal judicial systems. Courts following the supplemental
approach tend to view majority decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court, whether decided by a majority of five or nine, as the
predominant voice in constitutional affairs and thus entitled to
great deference. 46
Supplementalism calls for state supreme courts to assume
"the dominance of federal law and focus on the gap-filling poten-
41. Id.
42. Linde, supra note 13 at 166.
43. Williams, supra note 3, at 1018.




tial of state constitutions."47 The state court will look first to the
federal Constitution, and only if the federal Constitution does not
provide relief will it then turn to the state constitution to deter-
mine whether a departure from federal precedent is justified.48
State courts following this approach will generally use a set of in-
terpretative criteria to determine if there is something unique
about the state constitution that justifies departure from federal
precedent, 49 such as "differences in the constitutional text, struc-
ture, or history; differences in controlling state precedent; and dif-
ferences in the concerns or values of the local populace." 50 The
supplemental approach is based on the notion that the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the federal Constitution should authori-
tatively set limits on the meaning of similar provisions in state
constitutions.5 1 By extension, the Supreme Court's decisions are
therefore presumptively correct under this approach, and only an
"objectively verifiable difference between state and federal consti-
tutional analysis - whether textual, decisional, or historical -
[can] justify a state court's interpretational divergence from the
Federal Constitution."52 Weight is given to Supreme Court deci-
sions not because of the soundness of their reasoning, but because
the state supreme court implicitly places the United States Su-
preme Court at the apex of the constitutional decision-making hi-
erarchy.
Judicial opinions favoring the supplemental approach hold
that "our national judicial history and traditions closely wed fed-
eral and state constitutional doctrine,"53 and that "a considerable
measure of cooperation must exist in a truly effective federalist
system ... under what is publicly perceived as a single system of
47. Friedman, supra note 4, at 104 (quoting Colloquium, Developments in
the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1324, 1357 (1982)).
48. Id. The supplemental approach has also been called the "criteria ap-
proach" because it "utilizes a set of interpretive criteria for determining
whether deviation from U.S. Supreme Court precedent is warranted in a par-
ticular case." Id.
49. Id.
50. Gardner, supra note 8, at 1055.
51. Williams, supra note 3, at 1046.
52. Id. at 1023.
53. State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 964 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concur-
ring).
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law."54 To supplementalist courts:
Federal constitutional construction does not merely set
minimum standards for protected rights which the states
are free to increase; it strikes a balance among competing
rights and interests that is itself of constitutional signifi-
cance. While states may have more latitude in adjusting
this balance than they do in reducing guaranteed protec-
tions, that latitude is not unlimited. State courts are not
free from federal constitutional considerations in deter-
mining fundamental rights. The delicate balance among
those rights and other interests must be maintained. 55
In short, courts adopting the supplemental approach prefer an
analysis that emphasizes the national voice in state affairs to an
analysis that would augment the state's voice in national affairs. 56
These courts assert that faithfully adhering to the use of articu-
lated criteria ensures that a state court's decision is "made for well
founded legal reasons and not by merely substituting [the state
court's] notion of justice for that of... the United States Supreme
Court."57 Courts adopting the supplemental approach are con-
cerned that departures from Supreme Court precedent would re-
sult in the "inevitable shadowing of the moral authority of the
United States Supreme Court... [and in losing the] resolute trust
in that Court as the guardian of our liberties."58
Primacy courts, on the other hand, do not share this concern
to the same degree.59 They are persuaded to embrace the respon-
sibility of critically evaluating federal constitutional doctrine be-
fore ascribing its contents to their state constitution.
B. The Primacy Approach
Primacy entails two commitments by state supreme courts
and the advocates who appear before them. The first commitment
is to begin constitutional analysis with the state constitution and
54. Id.
55. Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 43 (Tex. 1992) (Hecht, J., concur-
ring) (emphasis added).
56. See id. at 42.
57. State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 813 (1986).
58. State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 815 (N.J. 1990) (O'Hern, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part).
59. See Friedman, supra note 4, at 106.
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its text, and to resort to adjudging federal constitutional rights
only when the state constitution itself does not provide relief. The
second is "to rely upon federal decisional law only for guidance in
illuminating the issues presented by analysis of the state constitu-
tional text."6° Primacy theory regards a state's constitution "as a
text with a particular and significant meaning for the state's citi-
zens,"61 which may differ from the significance and meaning of
particular provisions of the federal Constitution. The primacy ap-
proach adheres to the notion that "[a] state high court has the
duty, in interpreting the supreme law of the state, to adopt a rea-
soned interpretation of its own constitution despite what the
United States Supreme Court has said when interpreting a differ-
ent constitution under different institutional circumstances."
62
Primacy's mandate simply means that state courts use "the
familiar tools of constitutional interpretation in determining the
meaning of a state constitutional provision."63 Those tools include
the state constitution's text, structure, original intent and history,
and previous interpretations of similar textual provisions by other
state and federal courts.64 As former Justice Hans Linde, credited
as the originator of the primacy approach, 65 has stated:
The right question is not whether a state's guarantee is
the same as or broader than its federal counterpart as in-
terpreted by the Supreme Court. The right question is
what the state's guarantee means and how it applies to
the case at hand. The answer may turn out the same as it
would under federal law. The state's law may turn out to
be more protective than federal law. The state law also
may be less protective. In that case the court must go on
to decide the claim under federal law, assuming it has
been raised. 66
Under the primacy approach, state courts are responsible for
reaching independent conclusions as to the meaning of their state
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Williams, supra note 3, at 1048.
63. Friedman, supra note 4, at 106.
64. Id. at 106-07.
65. Id. at 106.
66. Linde, supra note 13, at 179 (emphasis added).
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constitutions even when the text is the same as that found in the
federal Constitution.67 A basic premise of primacy holds that "the
theory and methods of contemporary Supreme Court opinions do
not furnish the only proper model for decisions in the state
courts." 68 Consistent with the nation's experiment in federalism,
primacy recognizes the legitimate right, and indeed the obligation,
of state supreme courts interpreting their state constitutions to
independently evaluate federal Supreme Court rulings, and exer-
cise independent judgment about their correctness before import-
ing them into their state constitutional jurisprudence.69
The benefit of this approach is two-fold. First, when a state
court rejects the reasoning of Supreme Court precedents that nar-
rowly construe the scope of an individual right, the decision serves
as a public critique of the national ruling, and it can influence
public and official opinion concerning its propriety.7 0 Second, the
state court's decision may influence or add to a nationwide con-
sensus at the state level, a factor the Supreme Court may consider
in the course of its own constitutional decision-making.71
State judicial opinions advocating primacy reflect three gen-
eral themes: (1) When both state and federal constitutional issues
are raised, the state issues should be resolved before the federal
issues are addressed; (2) There are sound reasons for limited def-
erence to Supreme Court decisions when interpreting parallel
rights under the federal Constitution; and (3) There is strength in
the diversity of opinions that are thereby promoted.
67. Id. at 181-82.
68. Id. at 166.
69. See Gardner, supra note 8, at 1061, 1064.
70. See id. at 1033.
71. See id. A recent example of the latter effect is the Supreme Court's
2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Lawrence held that
a Texas statute making it a crime to engage in certain intimate conduct vio-lated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause as applied to adult
males engaging in consensual sodomy in the privacy of their home, overruling
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. In de-
ciding that Bowers should be overruled and its reasoning rejected, the Law-
rence majority noted that there had been substantial criticism of the Court's
reasoning in Bowers and that the highest courts of five different states de-
clined to follow it when interpreting provisions in their own state constitu-
tions parallel to the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Id. at 576-77. Those state court decisions helped persuade the Court that the rationale
underpinning Bowers could not withstand careful analysis. See id. at 570-7 1.
STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM
1. First Things First
State courts called upon to address both state and federal
constitutional issues should address the state issues before the
federal because it fundamentally diminishes, and even "dispar-
age[s],"72 the very existence of state constitutional rights when a
state court declines to address the nature of the rights, instead
choosing to answer federal constitutional questions first. More
practically, when a state court decision is based on state rather
than federal grounds, it ends the litigation without the necessity
of federal review; 73 however, when a state court decides a federal
constitutional claim, it is no more than the decision of an interme-
diate court, and its ruling is subject to review by the Supreme
Court, which in turn creates the need for the Supreme Court to
monitor and review the application of federal constitutional law by
the state courts.74 While state supreme courts are "left free and
unfettered" to interpret their own state constitutions, 75 the Su-
preme Court is obligated to determine the validity of state action
under the federal Constitution when that is the basis of a state
court decision. In this vein, the Vermont Supreme Court has
opined:
The most important reason for disposing of the state law
claims is our duty to the litigants. The defendant in this
case has specifically invoked the protections of the Ver-
mont Constitution. Our rulings on his federal claims are
all subject to federal reversal. Review of his claims under
the Vermont Constitution, however, may yield adequate
and independent state grounds to support our judgment,
thereby giving a final disposition to some of the claims at
issue in this appeal. If our state constitution is to mean
anything, it must be enforced where it is the only law ca-
pable of providing a final answer to a claim, and a party,
such as this defendant, has invoked its protections.76
Many courts broaden the rule that a state court will not ex-
72. Massachusetts v. Upton, 366 U.S. 727, 738 (1984) (Stevens, J., con-
curring).
73. See State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 750 (La. 1992).
74. See State v. Badger, 450 A.2d 336, 346-47 (Vt. 1982).
75. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983).
76. Badger, 450 A.2d at 347 (emphasis added).
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press an opinion on a constitutional issue if the matter can be re-
solved on nonconstitutional grounds to also mean that a state
court will not decide a case on federal constitutional grounds if it
can be decided on state constitutional grounds.7 7 For instance, the
Maine Supreme Court has succinctly stated that a "policy of judi-
cial restraint impels us to forbear from ruling on federal constitu-
tional questions when the provisions of our state constitution may
settle the matter."7 8 One jurist has offered that the principal justi-
fication for this "first-things-first" approach is that unless an indi-
vidual has been denied a remedy against the state under the state
constitution, he or she has not yet been denied due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the federal Constitution does not
apply.79 Stated another way, "if the individual may obtain a rem-
edy under state law, there has been no denial of due process and
thus no occasion for the federal [C]onstitution even to come into
play."o State constitutional law is analyzed first, "'not for the sake
of parochialism or of style, but because the state does not deny any
right claimed under the federal Constitution when the claim be-
fore the court in fact is fully met by state law.'"8'
In Massachusetts v. Upton, Justice Stevens opined, in a con-
curring opinion, that in order to maintain the proper balance be-
tween the respective jurisdictions of state and federal courts it is
"important that state judges do not unnecessarily invite [the
United States Supreme] Court to undertake review of state-courtjudgments... ,"82 Stevens further explained that to do so "reflects
a misconception of our constitutional heritage and the respectivejurisdictions of state and federal courts."83 Although the Bill of
Rights "is the ultimate guardian of individual rights,"84 the "fun-
damental premise" of our federal system is that the states "remain
the primary guardian of the liberty of the people."85 As a conse-
77. See, e.g., Perry, 610 So. 2d at 750; City of Portland v. Jacobsky, 496
A.2d 646, 648 (Me. 1985); Badger, 450 A.2d at 347.
78. Jacobsky, 496 A.2d at 648.
79. Freedom Socialist Party v. Bradbury, 48 P.3d 199, 205 (Or. 2002)(Landau, J., concurring).
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 126 (Or. 1981)).
82. 466 U.S. 727, 737 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 739.
85. Id.
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quence of those principles, primacy courts look to the state consti-
tutions they are ultimately responsible for before looking to the
federal Constitution for which they ultimately are not.
2. Cautious, Not Blind, Deference
When interpreting state constitutions, state supreme courts
often look to federal decisions addressing cognate federal provi-
sions. Primacy theory is defined by the view, however, that federal
constitutional decisions are only entitled to persuasive weight as
guideposts in interpreting specific state constitutions,
6 and only
when they are found to be "'logically persuasive and well-
reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the policies underly-
ing specific constitutional guarantees."'8
7 Primacy theory rejects
the notion that a Supreme Court decision is entitled to deference
because that Court is first among equals, or because it is at the
apex of a unified judicial structure.8 8 Just as the U.S. Supreme
Court is not bound by decisions of the Rhode Island Supreme
Court when construing the federal Constitution, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court is not bound by decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court when interpreting the Rhode Island Constitution, because
"[riegardless of the language employed in the two documents, they
are separate and distinct,"89 and each court has the duty to inter-
pret its own constitutional document.
This does not mean that state courts applying the primacy
approach should not have "high respect for opinions of the Su-
preme Court, particularly when they provide insight into the ori-
gins of provisions common to the state and federal bills of
rights."90 However, that respect must diminish by degrees where
the historical origins of state rights reflect different emphases and
concerns, or where the Supreme Court's interpretation and appli-
86. See Friedman, supra note 4, at 95.
87. Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 20 n.53 (Tex. 1992) (quoting Wil-
liam J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977)).
88. See Friedman, supra note 4, at 95. Instead, primacy courts "under-
take[] an independent constitutional analysis, using all the tools appropriate
to the task, and relying upon federal decisional law only for guidance." Id.
(emphasis added).
89. People v. Mitchell, 650 N.E.2d 1014, 1025 (Ill. 1995) (Heiple, J., dis-
senting).
90. State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1321 (Or. 1983).
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cation of a constitutional right is based upon what Justice Linde
called "a contemporary 'balance' of pragmatic considerations about
which reasonable people may differ over time and among the sev-
eral states."91 Linde has argued that the mere fact that state and
federal constitutions use substantially identical terms and gener-
ally seek to serve the same objective does not, however, "say much
toward demonstrating the correct application of such a constitu-
tional text. In particular, the proposition does not support the non
sequitur that the United States Supreme Court's decisions under
such a text not only deserve respect but presumptively fix its cor-
rect meaning also in state constitutions."92
Linde has further asserted that state constitutional guaran-
tees "were meant to be and remain genuine guarantees against
misuse of the state's governmental powers, truly independent of
the rising and falling tides of federal case law both in method and
in specifics."93 It should be axiomatic that state courts do not "ab-
dicate their responsibility for these independent guarantees, at
least not unless the people of the state themselves choose to aban-
don them and entrust their rights entirely to federal law"94 by
making it explicitly clear that the individual liberties in their
state constitutions are to be merely coextensive with whatever the
Supreme Court decides the extent of federal constitutional rights
should be. Thus, according to the primacy approach, state su-
preme courts should conduct independent analyses of their state
constitutions, "unless there are particular reasons to conform" to
Supreme Court precedent. 95
3. Diversity and the Value of Constitutional Dialogue96
Another important justification for the primacy approach is
diversity of opinion. There is strength in the diversity and compe-
tition of ideas on constitutional matters. "[Riather than
threaten[ing] the federal system.... [primacy] is more likely to
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1322.
93. Id. at 1323.
94. Id.
95. State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 960 (N.J. 1982) (Pashman, J., concur-
ring).
96. Freidman, supra note 4, at 112.
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create a healthy debate [concerning constitutional] law."97
Similar constitutional concepts can be developed in a va-
riety of ways. The path chosen by the United States Su-
preme Court is not necessarily the best, the most
protective of our constitutional rights, or the most reflec-
tive of the intent of the Framers. State supreme courts, if
not discouraged from independent constitutional analysis,
can serve, in Justice Brandeis' words, "as a laboratory"
testing competing interpretations of constitutional con-
cepts that may better serve the people of those states.
98
In short, true dual sovereignty is "not a weakness but a
strength of our system of government," 99 and "[dliversity is the
price of a decentralized legal system, or its justification, and guid-
ance on common issues may be found in the decisions of other
state courts as well as in those of the United States Supreme
Court."100 What is vital is the strength of the idea, not whether it
comes from a state or federal court, and primacy offers the possi-
bility that "[tihe national jurisprudence benefits as states across
[the] country offer [their own] contributions. As individual voices
develop strength and tone, so does the grand chorus improve."
101
It has been suggested that this diversity of opinion results in
a type of dialogue between state and federal courts, and the dia-
logue itself has constitutional value.10 2 In his article entitled The
Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial Federal-
ism, Lawrence Friedman asserted that dialogue between state and
federal courts is "an expectation of our constitutional order and as
a necessary implication of federalism, a complement to the com-
plex system of checks and balances."10 3 By acknowledging a state
supreme court's right to independently interpret state constitu-
tional text paralleling the Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court has
"invite[d] state courts to participate in the development of consti-
97. Id. at 961 (quoting Colloquium, Developments in the Law: The Inter-
pretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1324, 1396 (1982)).
98. Id. (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1931)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)) (citation omitted).
99. People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1348 (1992) (Kaye, J., concurring).
100. State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1323 (Or. 1983).
101. Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 22 (Tex. 1992).
102. See Friedman, supra note 4, at 93, 133.
103. Id. at 113.
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tutional law."10 4 This invitation creates an opportunity for the
state court to "engage in discourse with its federal counterpart
about the meaning of shared constitutional text - discourse about
such aspects of law and governance as the meaning of liberty,
equality, and due process .... Such discourse offers a means by
which the U.S. Supreme Court's actions may be assessed, evalu-
ated, and balanced."105
State court interpretations of cognate provisions can them-
selves be "appreciated, analyzed, and contrasted with federal
precedent by federal and state court judges, legislators, [and] ex-
ecutive branch personnel."o6 Friedman has asserted that there
can be more than one legitimate interpretation of a particular
text, as demonstrated by the sometimes fractured opinions of the
Supreme Court, especially in light of the broad phrases in which
constitutional rights are generally enumerated. 0 7 The true legiti-
macy of a particular interpretation does not depend upon whether
a state or federal supreme court is doing the interpreting, but
rather upon "the extent to which the interpretation at issue is
sound and plausible. And a particular interpretation of constitu-
tional text typically will be considered sound and plausible when
it is based upon an accepted mode of constitutional argument, cor-
rectly applied in the case at hand."108
Another commentator, Paul W. Kahn, has written that "[tihe
diversity of state courts is best understood as a diversity of inter-
pretive bodies,... [and elach state court has the authority to put
into place, within its community, its unique interpretation of that
common object" of American constitutionalism.109 Kahn refers to
"interpretive debate,"110 that is, the "debate over the meaning and
requirements of law.""' He has declared that "[tihe nation's com-
mitment to a rule of law that protects certain principles and val-
ues against political interests presents each generation with a
104. Id. at 125.
105. Id. at 126.
106. Id. at 129.
107. See id. at 135.
108. Id. at 134.
109. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutional-
ism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1148 (1993).
110. Id. at 1155.
111. Id.
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puzzle, not an answer,"112 and that the interpretive debate to solve
such puzzles should take place in the state courts as well as the
federal courts. 1 3 The interpretive inquiry, whether exercised by
federal or state court judges, turns to "any number of texts, prece-
dents, or historical events, as well as moral intuitions and princi-
pled arguments. The best interpretation is that which achieves
the greatest harmony among these diverse sources."" 4 The effort
of each judge is simply to construct the best interpretation of
which he or she is capable. Kahn argues that it is vital to our sys-
tem of federalism that state courts accept the invitation to engage
in this dialogue with the federal courts:
[A]uthority exercised responsibly is a ground for respect-
ing an interpretation. A state court interpreting Ameri-
can constitutionalism is, therefore, a powerful
counterforce to federal court interpretation of the United
States Constitution. The explanation of American citizen-
ship is too important a task to leave to the federal courts
alone.
This state-court function accords with a longstanding
justification of federalism under which state governments
provide a forum for discussion, disagreement, and opposi-
tion to actions of the national government."
15
This dialogic vision of state constitutionalism gives voice to a
state court's understanding of the constitutional values and prin-
ciples of the national community where there are no identifiable
bases for showing the state's constitutional values are unique, or
even where there are." 6 Only the primacy approach allows state
courts to speak to the Supreme Court on its own terms and debate




114. Id. at 1161.
115. Id. at 1166.
116. See id. at 1152, 1166; Friedman, supra note 4, at 133.
117. See Friedman, supra note 4, at 133-34.
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C. Fundamental Differences Between the Supplemental and
Primacy Approaches
One can readily see the fundamental differences between the
primacy and supplemental approaches. First, when a litigant
raises both state and federal constitutional arguments, the pri-
macy approach begins by addressing the state constitutional claim
first, determining what its scope is as a matter of state constitu-
tional law. 118 In reaching that determination, a primacy court will
review the text and history of the provision, any contemporaneous
legislative enactments, and prior judicial decisions from that state
bearing on the topic.119 Primacy courts will also review decisions
from other federal and state courts addressing the issue, but deci-
sions by a majority of the Supreme Court will influence the state
supreme court only by their innate persuasiveness, logic and rea-
soning. 20 Deference to a Supreme Court decision is based upon
the merits of the Court's rationale, not its status. Only if the state
constitutional protection does not afford relief will the state su-
preme court address the litigant's rights under the federal Consti-
tution. 2 1
Supplementalism, on the other hand, addresses the federal
constitutional right first, leaving state constitutions unexplored,
undeveloped and unaddressed, so long as the federal Constitution
provides relief. 22 When it is necessary to resort to the state consti-
tution, courts using the supplemental approach give substantial
weight to Supreme Court decisions, and presume that the Su-
preme Court's resolution of the federal constitutional issue is the
best resolution of the analogous state constitutional issue, unless
there is some compelling historical or textual state basis for pro-
viding more expansive protections. 123
Where a state constitutional provision has a substantially dif-
ferent text, origin and/or history than its federal counterpart, the
primacy and supplemental approaches do not differ significantly.
Courts adhering to either approach will explore the meaning and
118. See id. at 106.
119. See id. at 106-07; Gardner, supra note 8, at 1055.
120. See Friedman, supra note 4, at 106; Gardner, supra note 8, at 1055.
121. Friedman, supra note 4, at 106.
122. See Gardner, supra note 8, at 1055.
123. See id.
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import of those textual or historical differences. 124 The primacy
and supplemental approaches part company, however, when these
factors reveal no significant differences. In those circumstances,
supplementalism places a higher value on national uniformity
than on contributing to the national discourse on constitutional
issues.125 Primacy, conversely, is not at all reluctant to add to that
discourse, and to independently consider the merits of national
constitutional decisions. 26 For example, a five-to-four Supreme
Court decision on a federal constitutional issue is likely to be the
definitive word for the supplementalist state supreme court when
interpreting its own constitution, notwithstanding the fact that
the Supreme Court decision may have overruled numerous lower
federal court and state supreme court decisions. 27 Under the pri-
macy approach, however, both the majority and dissenting views
of that same Supreme Court decision are open to searching and
discerning criticism, and if the majority's interpretation, rationale
and/or conclusion is determined to be unpersuasive, it will not be
imported into the state constitutional jurisprudence. 28 Primacy
thus contemplates two distinct court systems with distinct powers
and obligations, two systems that communicate with one another
about what are, or should be, common constitutional values and
principles.
Given this foundation, the remainder of this article will focus
on discerning the Rhode Island Supreme Court's view of state con-
stitutionalism and how it views its own role in the federalist
scheme. Does it view the Declaration of Certain Constitutional
Rights and Principles (Declaration of Rights), found in article I of
the state constitution, 129 as an independent repository of constitu-
tional liberties that it is bound to investigate, analyze, explain and
expound upon before reaching federal constitutional issues? Or is
it viewed as mostly a redundant backdrop to the federal Constitu-
tion, either unintended or ill-suited to have any significant inde-
pendent meaning or value? Does the Rhode Island Supreme Court
engage in debate with the U.S. Supreme Court on the proper ex-
124. See id.
125. See id. at 1057.
126. See Friedman, supra note 4, at 133.
127. See id. at 109.
128. See id. at 133.
129. See R.I. CONST. art. I.
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tent of constitutional rights found in both ihe state and federal
constitutions, or does it simply defer to the Court's decisions with-
out considering their merits? And if it does, why does it do so?
How should it implement its responsibility to give the Declaration
of Rights meaning and content? To answer these questions, some
insight is gathered by beginning at the beginning, by sketching an
outline of the origin and development of the Declaration of Rights
in article I of the Rhode Island Constitution, and discerning the
Rhode Island Supreme Court's intended role as the guardian of
those state constitutional rights.
III. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE RHODE ISLAND SUPREME
COURT'S ROLE AS GUARDIAN OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
In the matter of In re Advisory Opinion (Chief Justice), Asso-
ciate Justice Thomas F. Kelleher described the longstanding rela-
tionship between the Rhode Island General Assembly and the
state's highest court.130 That history provides the starting point for
understanding the origin of the Rhode Island Supreme Court's
role as guardian of state constitutional rights, and what the extent
of its role should be today.
A. The Pre-1776 Charter Government
In 1643, Roger Williams and the colonists who settled at the
head of Narragansett Bay received a patent from the English Par-
liamentll "[giving] the inhabitants of Providence, Portsmouth,
Newport, and later Warwick a 'free and absolute Charter of Civil
Incorporation.' 132 It was adopted in 1647 at a General Court of
Election, which also enacted legislation establishing a General
Court of Trials for the whole colony.133 This court consisted of a
president, who was the chief officer of the colony, and assistants
from each of the four towns.134 The 1647 General Court of Election
130. See id. at 1328-34.
131. See id. at 1328.
132. Id. (quoting WILLIAM R. STAPLES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF "THE INCORPORATION OF PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS," AND THE
CODE OF LAWS ADOPTED BY THAT ASSEMBLY IN 1647 VIII, IX (1847)).
133. Id. (citing JOHN RUSSELL BARTLETT, 1 RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF
RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS, IN NEW ENGLAND 147, 191
(1856)).
134. Id. (citing JoHN RUSSELL BARTLETT, 1 RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF
RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS, IN NEW ENGLAND 194-95
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also adopted a legal code, 135 codifying the parts of the common and
statutory laws of England it deemed binding on the colony, so as
to conform to "the nature and constitution of their place."136 The
code also contained a commitment to setting limitations on the
lawmaking power, which the colony would respect.137
After the English monarchy was restored, the colony sought
and received a Royal Charter, 38 which was accepted by a General
Assembly of "freemen" in Newport in November 1663.139 It called
for an annual election of a governor, a deputy governor and ten
assistants, who were collectively called the General Assembly. 140
This legislative body was empowered to make or repeal any law
not contrary or repugnant to the laws of England.' 4 ' The judicial
structure formed in 1647 was not fundamentally altered and the
General Court of Trials was retained, 142 but "[firom time to time
several inferior courts were also created."143 Because legislative
and judicial functions were combined in the same body of men,
namely the governor, deputy governor, and assistants,'" "the
(1856)); see also PATRICK T. CONLEY, DEMOCRACY IN DECLINE: RHODE ISLAND'S
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT: 1776-1841 20 (1977).
135. See CONLEY, supra note 134, at 19.
136. WILLIAM R. STAPLES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OF "THE INCORPORATION OF PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS," AND THE CODE OF LAWS
ADOPTED BY THAT ASSEMBLY IN 1647 3 (1847).
137. See CONLEY, supra note 134, at 19-20; see also JOHN RUSSELL
BARTLETT',' 1 RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE
PLANTATIONS, IN NEW ENGLAND 158 (1856):
And now, forasmuch as our Charter gives us powre to make such
Lawes, Constitutions, Penalties and Officers of Justice for the execu-
tion thereof as we, or the greater part of vs shall, by free consent,
agree vnto, and yet does premise that those Lawes, Constitutions, and
Penalties soe made shall be conformable to the Lawes of England, soe
far as the nature and constitution of our place will admit, to the end
that we may show ourselves.., willingly and exceedingly desirous to
preserve every man safe in his person, name and estate ....
Id. (emphasis added).
138. In re Advisory Opinion (Chief Justice), 507 A.2d 1316, 1329 (R.I.
1986) (Kelleher, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 1329.
140. CONLEY, supra note 134, at 23, 24.
141. Id. at 24.
142. PATRICK T. CONLEY, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF LAW AND
LAWYERS IN RHODE ISLAND: 1636-1998 14, 21 (1998).
143. Id.
144. See id. at 18.
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General Assembly often exercised functions now considered the
exclusive domain of the judicial branch,"145 and it exercised "ex-
tensive control over the judicial affairs of the colony." 146
In 1666, the General Court of Trials and General Jail Deliv-
ery was created by statute. 147 That court, like the prior General
Court of Trials, "was to consist of the governor, the deputy gover-
nor, and assistants." 48 Any litigant's appeal rights were to the
General Assembly, "which was authorized to alter, amend, or re-
verse such judgments and give a new judgment thereupon 'as to
the said assembly shall appear to be agreeable in law and eq-
uity.'"'149 In 1719, the General Court was renamed the Superior
Court of Judicature, Court of Assize, and General Jail Delivery,150
but it still consisted of the same personnel, and appeals were still
taken by petition to the full General Assembly. 151 That same year,
the General Assembly became bicameral, and the "governor, dep-
uty governor, and assistants [sat] as the 'upper' house and the
deputies of the several towns compris[ed] the 'lower' house."15 2
1746 saw the governor and his assistants removed from the
superior court bench, replaced by a chief justice and four associ-
ates; according to historian Patrick T. Conley, however, "this
change did not significantly diminish legislative influence. Judges
could still be members of the [General] Assembly, so those depu-
ties or assistants appointed to the bench usually retained their
145. Id. at 21.
146. Id. at 19. This legislative control of the judiciary is not terribly sur-
prising, however. Rhode Island, like other early colonies, developed from an
English tradition that did not feature a separation of powers as we know it
today. Ellen E. Sward, A History of Civil Trial in the United States, 51 U.
KAN. L. REV. 347, 364 (2003). In fact,
The early colonies had even more reason to combine these functions,
as there were so few people in the colonies that it was impracticable
to try and set up different governmental entities to perform different
tasks. Thus, the early colonies often had a single body that per-
formed all of these functions, usually called the General Court or
General Assembly.
Id. at 364-65.
147. In re Advisory Opinion (Chief Justice), 507 A.2d 1316, 1329 (R.I.
1986) (Kelleher, J., dissenting) (citing 1730 R.I. Pub. Laws 8).
148. Id.





legislative posts." 153 Petition could also still be made to the Gen-
eral Assembly for appellate review and "the legislature estab-
lished a formal procedure for receiving, 'hearing and determining'
petitions praying for relief from court decisions, thus strengthen-
ing and reaffirming its appellate powers, which were similar to
those possessed by the English House of Lords."154 According to
Conley, the petition process and the annual appointment of judges
persisted not only throughout the colonial period, but up until the
establishment of the state constitution in 1843.155 As the Rhode
Island Supreme Court was to later note in Gorham v. Robinson,
56
under the Charter, the General Assembly
had the power to remove any of the judges at any time;
and, as to the principles of the separation of powers and
of the independence of the judiciary, [we cannot see that
they were given] much recognition under a system of gov-
ernment in which all the judges of the highest court were
annually elected by the General Assembly, which also
claimed and, whenever it chose, exercised the power to
adjudicate cases and to reverse the decisions and judg-
ments of the [state's highest court].157
Under the Charter, therefore, no "independent" judiciary ex-
isted under any meaningful definition of that term.
58
B. The Post- 1776 Charter Government
Following the Declaration of Independence, the authority of
general sovereignty passed to each of the former colonial states,
and the Continental Congress passed a resolution advising the
colonies to form new governments.15 9 Most did, drafting their own
state constitutions to define the limits of the state's authority and
to include declarations of rights, often based on rights developed
at common law.160 In the 1770's and 1780's, Americans began to
153. CONLEY, supra note 142, at 21-22.
154. Id. at 22.
155. See id.
156. 186 A. 832 (R.I. 1936).
157. Id. at 841 (emphasis omitted).
158. See id.
159. See Randy J. Holland, State Constitutions: Purpose and Function, 69
TEMP. L. REV. 989, 989-90 (1996).
160. See id. at 990, 995.
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conceive of "a constitution as a written delimitation of the grant of
power made by the people to the government," 161 which led to "'the
important distinction so well understood in America, between a
Constitution established by the people and unalterable by the
government, and a law established by the government and alter-
able by the government.'" 162 These new constitutions emphasized a
liberty that "was personal or private, the protection of individual
rights against all governmental encroachments, particularly by
the legislature." 63 The governments established by these constitu-
tions were "no longer designed merely to promote the collective
happiness of the people, but also,... 'to protect citizens in their
personal liberty and their property' even against the public
will." 64
Rhode Islanders did not, however, take the opportunity to
adopt such a constitution or create such a government, and for the
next sixty-seven years the Charter remained the state's governing
document. 65 Consequently, the only limit on the state's power
against the individual remained in the Charter, which stated only
that laws enacted by the General Assembly had to be consistent
with the laws of England, 66 and the ultimate authority to make
that determination remained in the General Assembly itself as the
"court of last resort."167 Conley has noted that "[a]lthough the re-
tention of the colonial charter was unusual, few people were dis-
turbed by its continued operation" 68 perhaps because at the time,
"rights-related controversies among Rhode Islanders were rare."169
Another explanation, not inconsistent with Conley's, is sug-
gested by Professor Gordon S. Wood's observation that "[iut is diffi-
cult for us today to appreciate the respect and wonder with which
nearly all Englishmen held Parliament" in the seventeenth and
161. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-
1787 601 (1969).
162. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 53, at 409 (Alexander Hamilton)
(John C. Hamilton ed., 1998)).
163. Id. at 609.
164. Id.
165. See In re Advisory Opinion (Chief Justice), 507 A.2d 1316, 1330 (R.I.
1986) (Kelleher, J., dissenting).
166. See CONLEY, supra note 142, at 18.
167. See In re Advisory Opinion (Chief Justice), 507 A.2d at 1329; CONLEY,
supra note 142, at 18.
168. CONLEY, supra note 142, at 174, 205.
169. Id. at 178.
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eighteenth centuries. 170 "Parliament was the great defender
against tyranny. It was the august author of the Bill of Rights of
1689, the historical protector of the people's property, and the
eternal bulwark of their liberties against the encroachments of the
Crown."171 In the centuries following the signing of the Magna
Carta in 1215, English history saw a continuing struggle over
rights and continued attempts by the English people to place lim-
its on their king.172 The struggle was "finally settled in the Glori-
ous Revolution of 1688 and 1689,"173 when Parliament set forth a
Declaration of Rights "which became a statute or Bill of Rights
when the new King William III approved them."174 The statute de-
clared certain actions of the crown illegal and "asserted certain
rights and freedoms possessed by Englishmen, including the right
to bear arms, to petition the king, to have free elections and fre-
quent Parliaments in which speech would be free, and to have no
excessive bail or fines." 175 Parliament was also the king's highest
court,176 and as Professor Wood has described:
The English Bill of Rights was designed to protect the
subjects not from the power of Parliament but from the
power of the king. Indeed, it was inconceivable that Par-
liament could endanger the subjects' rights. Only the
crown could do that. Parliament was the highest court in
the land and was therefore the bulwark and guardian of
the people's rights and liberties; there was no point in
limiting it. Consequently, there were no legal or constitu-
tional restrictions placed on the actions of the English
Parliament. .... 177
By the last quarter of the eighteenth century, most English-
men believed that all "moral and natural law limitations on the
170. GORDON S. WOOD, THE AMERICANIZATION OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 118
(2004).
171. Id.
172. See Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Vested Rights in the Early Repub-
lic, 85 VA. L. REV. 1421, 1424 (1999) (article based on the McCorkle Lecture
delivered at the University of Virginia School of Law on March 11, 1999).
173. Id. at 1425.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1423.
177. Id. at 1425.
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Parliament were strictly theoretical, without legal meaning, and
relevant only in so far as they impinged on the minds of the law-
makers."178 Consequently, "every act of Parliament was in a sense
a part of the [English] constitution, and all law, customary and
statutory, was thus constitutional."179
The English Parliament was composed of the "three estates of
the realm - Crown, Lords, and Commons - who, together, repre-
sent[ed] the sovereignty of the people."' 80 Each were thought to
make a valuable and effective contribution to law-making, and
"roughly corresponded to Aristotle's ideal form of 'mixed govern-
ment,' which included elements of the monarchy, aristocracy, and
democracy, each of which had virtues that would act as a check on
the vices of the others."81 The Crown, joined with the Lords,
would suppress the tendencies of the Commons; the Lords and
Commons the arbitrariness of the Crown; and the Commons and
the Crown the oligarchic tendencies of the aristocratic Lords.182
"Because the entire realm was represented within it, Parliament
was considered to be both omnipotent and omnicompetent"183 with
its own internal system of checks and balances.84 It was not sim-
ply the highest court among others in the land, but was "the sov-
ereign lawmaker of the realm, whose power, [even if] arbitrary
and unreasonable, was uncontrollable."185
As a consequence, "[b]y the time of the American [R] evolution,[I most educated Englishmen had become convinced that their
rights existed only against the crown. Against their representative
or sovereign Parliament, which was the guardian of these rights,
they existed not at all."18 6 It has been argued that for this reason,
Americans generally embraced the idea of legislative supremacy,
the legislature then being invested with the sovereignity of the
populace.187 If this was the general view of the American Revolu-
178. WOOD, supra note 161, at 260.
179. Id. at 261.
180. Matthew P. Harrington, Judicial Review Before John Marshall, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 55 (2003).
181. Id. at 58.
182. Id. at 61.
183. Id. at 58.
184. Id. at 61.
185. WOOD, supra note 161, at 265.
186. Wood, supra note 172, at 1426.
187. See Harrington, supra note 180, at 54.
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tion, it was also the view of early Rhode Islanders. "Of necessity,
this meant that the legislatures themselves were the judges of the
constitutionality of their own actions. Indeed, it was often said in
this period that the Constitution was a 'rule of the legislature
only,' and was not judicially enforceable in the courts."88
Moreover, the idea that the judiciary would be subject to the
control of the legislature, as reflected in Rhode Island's Charter
government, was not an exceptional or novel idea in the time im-
mediately following the American Revolution. Although the doc-
trine of separation of powers would eventually become what
James Madison would call "a first principle of free government,"18 9
Professor Wood has written that "Americans in 1776 gave only a
verbal recognition to the concept of separation of powers in their
Revolutionary constitutions, since they were apparently not con-
cerned with a real division of departmental functions."190 Some
historians believe that separation of powers in the 1776 constitu-
tions meant "nothing more than a prohibition of plural office hold-
ing."191
Despite John Adams's warnings in his Thoughts on
Government that "an upright and skillful administration
of justice" required the judicial power "to be distinct from
both the legislative and executive, and independent upon
both," most of the early constitution-makers had little
sense that judicial independence meant independence
from the people.... [Clonstitutional provisions giving
control of the courts and judicial tenure to the legisla-
tures actually represented the culmination of what the co-
lonial assemblies had been struggling for in their
eighteenth century contests with the Crown. The Revolu-
tionaries had no intention of curtailing legislative inter-
ference in the court structure.... and in fact they meant
to increase it.192
According to Professor Wood, "[tihe expanded meaning of
separation of powers,. . . along with a new conception of judicial
188. Id.
189. WOOD, supra note 161, at 152.
190. Id. at 153-54.
191. Id. at 156.
192. Id. at 161.
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independence, had to await the experience of the years ahead."193
And so it did. Within a relatively short time after the Revolu-
tion, the "democratic despotism" of the legislative assemblies that
seemed so contradictory in 1775 and 1776 began to emerge. 194 In
the period between 1776 and 1803, American perception of legisla-
tive power underwent a radical transformation.195 The rise of leg-
islative arbitrariness caused the belief in legislative supremacy to
give way to a different understanding of the legislature's role.196
Instead of being supreme, legislatures were increasingly viewed as
merely one of the people's agents, whose powers were more limited
in scope than previously thought.197 This gave rise to the realiza-
tion that some other authority must have the power to determine
when the legislature had gone beyond the scope of its powers or
intruded on the rights retained by the people.198 In other words,
Americans were faced with the dilemma of protecting individual
rights and limiting popular government, while at the same time
not denying the sovereign power of the majority of the people. 199
As Professor Wood has concluded:
This dilemma led Americans to think freshly about a
number of constitutional issues ..... Most difficult of all
was the formulating of a defense of individual rights and
liberties against the people themselves - against Parlia-
ment, so to speak. ...
The secret was to identify the popular legislatures with
the former monarchial power (which is what is meant by
the term "democratical despotism") and involve the tradi-
tional language of the rights of Englishmen in these new
republican circumstances.... Since, unlike England, the
representative legislatures were the source of the prob-
lem, not the solution, some other bulwark for individual
rights would have to be found. This meant that the cru-
cial issues of individual rights had to be taken out of the
193. Id.
194. See Wood, supra note 172, at 1434.




199. Wood, supra note 172, at 1435.
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hands of the popular legislatures and placed in the hands
of some other institution, which turned out to be the
courts.
20 0
By the 1780's, Americans began looking to the judiciary as a
means of restraining, in Professor Wood's words, "the rampaging
and unstable popular legislatures."201 The judiciary in several
states began to gingerly, and sometimes ambiguously, move, in
isolated cases to impose restraints on what the legislatures were
enacting as law, effectively saying to the legislatures: "Here is the
limit of your authority; and, hither, shall you go, but no fur-
ther."20 2 In Rhode Island, this revolution in constitutional thinking
and the ordering of government was asserted not by the legisla-
tively and annually appointed judiciary, but instead by a member
of the bar, James Mitchell Varnum, in the 1786 case of Trevett v.
Weeden. 203
Trevett arose after the General Assembly passed an Emitting
Act authorizing the issuance of paper currency that would be
"'good and lawful [t]ender, ... [and would] [d]ischarge of all debts
[then] due and contracted."2°4 As the value of this currency de-
clined, many merchants refused to accept the paper money in de-
fiance of the Emitting Act. 205 The General Assembly responded
with the passage of a Forcing Act, making it a criminal offense to
refuse the paper money, and more importantly, providing that the
violators were to be tried at a special court without the benefit of a
jury.206 In Trevett, John Trevett filed an information under the
Forcing Act against John Weeden, a Newport businessman who
refused to accept the paper money. 20 7 In Weeden's defense, Var-
num urged the court to use its power to review the Force Act and
declare it unconstitutional and void.
208
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1436.
202. WOOD, supra note 161, at 455 (quoting George Wythe of Virginia, who
is claimed to have spoken the words in 1782).
203. See Harrington, supra note 180, at 79. The opinion of Trevett is unre-
ported. Id. at 79 n.111.
204. Id. at 79 (quoting An Act for Emitting One Hundred Thousand
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Varnum made two distinct arguments. Quoting Bacon and
Coke, 209 he first contended "that acts contrary to common right
and reason were not law and 'that the power of construing a stat-
ute is in the Judges; for they have authority over all laws, more
especially over statutes, to mold them according to reason and
convenience to the best and truest use.'"210 But, "Varnum also re-
sorted to a more modern distinction between the fundamental law
of the constitution and ordinary statutory law, arguing that the
[General Assembly] could never make a law contrary to the prin-
ciples of the constitution, not simply because such a law was in-
herently unjust but because the principles of the constitution
'were ordained by the people anterior to and created the powers of
the General Assembly.'211
According to Varnum, a constitution or charter was a compact
of the people surrendering some of their natural rights to the gov-
ernment, and "'[tihe aggregate of this surrender forms the power
of government,' including the power to make laws." 212 "'Conse-
quently the Legislature cannot intermeddle with the retained
rights of the people,"' 2 3 and the judiciary's special task was to "'re-ject all acts of the Legislature that are contrary to the trust re-
posed in them by the people."'214 Varnum asserted that "the trial
by jury is a fundamental right, a part of our legal constitution,"215
and that "the Legislature cannot deprive the citizens of this
right."216
Varnum was not alone in his reassessment of the limits of leg-
islative supremacy. Several months later, in May 1787, it was ar-
chitects of Rhode Island Statehood, 50 R.I.B.J. 15, 34 (2002); WOOD, supra
note 161, at 459.
209. WOOD, supra note 161, at 459.
210. Id. at 459-60 (quoting James M. Varnum, during the unreported case
of Trevitt v. Weedon, tried before the Honorable Superior Court in the County
of Newport, September Term, 1786).




215. Harrington, supra note 180, at 79.
216. Id. In addition to the right to trial by jury being part of the unwrittenEnglish Constitution, the Royal Charter of 1663, which bounded the Rhode
Island General Assembly's authority, retained the right to trial by jury. SeePaul D. Carrington, The Civil Jury and American Democracy, 13 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 79, 82-83 (2003).
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gued in a local newspaper, the Providence Gazette, that all legis-
lative acts were "'liable to examination and scrutiny by the people,
that is, by the Supreme Judiciary, their servants for this purpose;
and those that militate with the fundamental laws, or impugn the
principles of the constitution, 'are to be judicially set aside as void,
and of no effect." 217 In another Providence Gazette article in Au-
gust of that same year, it was asserted that "legislators who en-
acted laws that 'violate[d] ... fundamental principles ... [were]
substituting power for right."
2 1s
Despite Varnum's "learned and eloquent" arguments in Tre-
vitt 219 and the urging of the contemporary media, neither the
members of the court nor the General Assembly embraced the re-
alignment of power from the legislature to judiciary. Contempo-
rary accounts of the case state merely that the judges dismissed
the case because "the information [was] not cognizable before
them,"220 apparently deciding not to proceed because the case was
heard in a special session and not a special court as required by
the statute, and consequently side-stepping the constitutional is-
sue raised by Varnum.221 Other accounts, however, reported that
three of the Trevitt judges declared the statute void: one asserting
that the court lacked jurisdiction, and the rest not setting forth a
reason. 222 This was sufficient cause for the General Assembly to
summon the judges to appear before them to explain the deci-
sion.223 After some debate, the legislature decided not to pursue
impeachment, but four of the five judges were not reappointed in
the next session.224
After Trevett, Rhode Islanders began taking small, subtle
steps toward enhanced legal protection of individual liberties. In
1798, three significant laws were adopted. 225 The first of these acts
217. WOOD, supra note 161, at 456 (quoting PROVIDENCE GAZETTE &
COUNTRY J., May 12, 1787).
218. William E. Nelson, The Province of the Judiciary, 37 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 325, 352 (2004) (quoting PROVIDENCE GAZETTE & COUNTRY J., Aug. 5,
1786, at 2).
219. See Conley, supra note 208, at 34.
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changed the name of the highest court to the "Supreme Judicial
Court," and provided that the justices could no longer be members
of either house of the General Assembly.226 This ensured that
those officers exercising judicial authority would be separate and
distinct from the legislative officers, although the justices would
continue to be appointed annually. 227 The second and third acts
were rights-creating. The second act was an "Act Relative to Reli-
gious Freedom and the Maintenance of Ministers," and the third
was an "Act Declaratory of Certain Rights of the People of this
State."228 The Religious Freedom Act was a statutory guarantee of
religious liberty, while the Act Declaratory of Certain Rights was
a "statutory bill of rights" that listed a number of "'political axioms
or truths,' which were declared 'to be of paramount obligation in
all legislative, judicial and executive proceedings."229 Those politi-
cal truths included:
[11 the right of all to a legal remedy for injuries or wrongs
to property and character, [2] protection against unrea-
sonable search and seizure, [31 immunity from double
jeopardy, [4] protection from excessive bail and cruel and
unusual punishment, [5] the privilege of habeas corpus,
[61 a guarantee of procedural due process, [7] the termi-
nation of imprisonment for debt once the debtor's estate
had been delivered up for the benefit of his creditors, [8] a
bar on ex post facto laws, [9] freedom from involuntary
self-incrimination, and [10] a presumption of innocence
until guilt was proven. 230
While these political rights and liberties were declared
"paramount,"231 and while there was finally a court distinct from
the legislature to enforce them as statutory rights, the court was
still subject to the will of the legislature. Either of the laws could
be repealed in whole or in part by the General Assembly, and it
in the Digest of 1798, the first compilation and revision of the general laws
since 1767.").
226. See In re Advisory Opinion (Chief Justice), 507 A.2d 1316, 1330(1986) (Kelleher, J., dissenting).
227. See id.
228. See CONLEY, supra note 134, at 172.




still had the power to function as an appeals court to review any
decision of the supreme judicial court that might concern those
rights.2 2 Indeed, the Digest of 1798 contained a reaffirmation of
the General Assembly's final appellate authority, setting forth a
petition process permitting any person to petition the General As-
sembly "praying that any judgment, rule of court, or determina-
tion whatever, may be set aside."23 3 The General Assembly could
also simply remove the justices responsible for the decision at the
next annual election. 234 Four decades later, however, "the omnipo-
tence and adamancy of the legislature, and the absence of a con-
stitutional bill of rights became grievances severe enough" to
create a movement for the establishment of a new constitutional
document.235
C. The Struggle for a Constitutional Government
The "agitation [for reform eventually] prompted the General
Assembly to authorize a constitutional convention," scheduled for
November 1841.236 The reformers "exhorted the adult male citi-
zenry to disregard the landholding qualifications [for voting] and
to go to the polls to elect delegates to a People's Convention, which
would meet in October"23 7. The Landholders Convention was au-
thorized by the Charter government and did not produce a draft
constitution; the People's Convention, however, "presented a pro-
posed constitution to the white male population for ratification,
regardless of whether they were landholders."238 This document
called for a separation of power between the judiciary and the leg-
islature, and for the independence of the judiciary. It provided, in
relevant part:
Article III
Of the Distribution of Powers
232. See Patrick T. Conley, Article VI, Section 4: A Case Study in Constitu-
tional Obsolescence, 53 R.I.B.J. 7, 9 (2004).
233. Id.
234. See In re Advisory Opinion (Chief Justice), 507 A.2d 1316, 1330
(1986) (Kelleher, J., dissenting).
235. CONLEY, supra note 142, at 205.
236. Id. at 242. 245.
237. Id. at 246.
238. Id.
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1. The power of Government shall be distributed into
three departments, the Legislative, the Executive and the
Judicial.
2. No person or persons connected with one of these de-
partments shall exercise any of the powers belonging to
either of the others, except in cases herein directed or
permitted.
Article IV
Of the Legislative Department
The Legislative power shall be vested in two distinct
Houses, the one to be called the House of Representa-




1. This Constitution shall be the Supreme Law of the
State; and all laws contrary to, or inconsistent with the
same, which may be passed by the General Assembly,
shall be null and void.
4. No jurisdiction shall hereafter be entertained by the
General Assembly in cases of... appeal from judicial de-
cisions, nor in any other matters appertaining to the ju-
risdiction of the Judges and Courts of law. But the
General Assembly shall confer upon the Courts of the
State all necessary powers affording relief in the cases
herein named; and the General Assembly shall exercise
all other jurisdiction and authority, which they have
heretofore entertained, and which is not prohibited by, or




1. The Judicial Power of the State shall be vested in one
Supreme Court, and in such other Courts inferior to the
Supreme Court, as the Legislature may, from time to
time, ordain and establish.239
The new constitutional scheme envisioned by the People's
Constitution represented a dramatic departure from the Charter,
providing for a clear separation of judicial and legislative power,
and prohibiting the General Assembly from exercising judicial
power.
In response, the Landholder's Convention was reconvened
and produced a draft of an alternative constitution, sometimes re-
ferred to as the Landholder's or Freemen's Constitution. 240 Al-
though this proposed constitution, drafted by a Convention called
by the General Assembly, ostensibly called for a separation of
powers, it effectively rejected separation of judicial and legislative
power and called for a continuing co-mingling of those powers in
the General Assembly as had been the practice under the Charter.
It provided, in relevant part:
Article Third
[Of the Distribution of Powers.
Section 1. The powers of the government shall be distrib-
uted into three distinct departments: the Legislative, Ex-
ecutive and Judicial.
Sec. 2. No person or persons belonging to one of these de-
partments shall exercise any of the powers properly be-
longing to either of the others, except in cases herein
expressly directed or permitted.]
Article Fourth
Of the Legislative Power
239. R.I. CONST. art. III, §§ 2, 3; art. IV, § 1; art. IX, §§ 1, 4; art. XI § 1
(Proposed Draft 1841), reprinted in 2 ELIsHA R. POTTER, R.I. CONSTITUTION
(1843) (emphasis added). These proposals were finally adopted by the Peo-
ple's Convention in Providence on Nov. 18, 1841. See POTTER, supra.
240. See Conley, supra note 142, at 249-50.
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Section 1. This Constitution shall be the supreme law of
the State, and all laws enacted contrary thereto, shall be
void.
Sec. 2. The Legislative power, under this Constitution,
shall be vested in two distinct Houses, or Branches,...
the one to be styled the Senate, the other the House of
Representatives; and both together, the General Assem-
bly.
Sec. 10. The General Assembly shall continue to exercise
the judicial power, ... and all other powers they have
heretofore exercised not inconsistent with this Constitu-
tion.
Article Eleventh
Of the Judicial Power
Sec. 1. The Judicial power of this state shall be vested in
one Supreme Judicial Court, and in such other inferior
Courts as the General Assembly may from time to time
ordain and establish;241
The Landholders' proposed constitution essentially called for
a continuation of the relationship between the supreme judicial
court and the General Assembly as had existed under the Charter,
while the ultimate judicial authority and responsibility for indi-
vidual liberties would remain in the General Assembly.
After the Freemen's Constitution was narrowly defeated at
the polls, two rival governments were subsequently elected - one
under the People's Constitution, and one "Law and Order" gov-
ernment under the Charter - which gave rise to a period of tur-
moil known as the Dorr Rebellion. 242 When the Law and Order
party prevailed, it convened another constitutional convention in
the fall of 1842 which substantially framed the present state con-
241. R.I. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2; art. IV, §§ 1, 2, 10; art. XI § 1 (Proposed
Draft 1842), reprinted in 2 POTrER, supra note 239.
242. See CONLEY, supra note 142, 250-66
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stitution.243 That constitution was remarkable for its ambiguity
with respect to the separation of judicial and legislative powers.
Whereas the People's Constitution and the Freemen's Constitu-
tion took opposed but clearly expressed positions on the appropri-
ate political and governmental structure, the constitution that
was ultimately enacted seems to have been deliberately ambigu-
ous, leaving the question unresolved. It provided, in relevant part:
Article Third
Of the Distribution of Powers
The powers of government shall be distributed into three
departments; the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial.
Article Fourth
Of the Legislative Powers
Section 1. The Constitution shall be the supreme law of
the State, and any law inconsistent therewith shall be
void. The General Assembly shall pass all laws necessary
to carry this Constitution into effect.
Sec. 2. The Legislative power, under this Constitution,
shall be vested in two Houses, the one to be called the
Senate, the other the House of Representatives; and both
together the General Assembly.
Sec. 10. The General Assembly shall continue to exercise
the powers they have heretofore exercised, unless prohib-
ited in this Constitution.
Article Tenth
Of the Judicial Power
Section 1. The Judicial power of this State shall be vested
in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the
243. Id. at 266.
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General Assembly may, from time to time, ordain and es-
tablish.244
While the People's Constitution specifically removed the ulti-
mate judicial power from the General Assembly and placed it
solely in the supreme court, the Freemen's, or Landholder's, Con-
stitution specifically reserved ultimate judicial power to the Gen-
eral Assembly.245 The constitution that was ultimately adopted in
1842, however, did not specifically address the General Assembly's
exercise of judicial power. That decision, we shall see, was ulti-
mately left to a future day. The framers seem to have chosen am-
biguity over making a clear decision on separation of the
legislative and judicial branches of government in Rhode Island.
The new state constitution, however, did achieve two notable
objectives. First, it shifted the already established commitment to
the paramount political axioms and truths in the Digest of 1798
from statutory law to the stiffer bedrock of state constitutional
law. Article I of the constitution contained twenty-three sections
and became the "Declaration of Certain Constitutional Rights and
Principles."246 Among the twenty-three sections, section 3 was
based on the Religious Freedom Act enacted in 1798, while sec-
tions 5 through 14 incorporated with almost no change the ten
sections of the 1798 statutory declaration of rights.24 7
The second, more subtle change was to give the state's su-
preme court justices what Chief Justice Samuel Ames would sub-
sequently call a "firmer tenure,"248 "a comparatively stable tenure
of office." 249 The new constitution provided, in article X, section 4,
that the judges of the supreme court would still be elected by the
two houses of the legislature in grand committee, as they had un-
der the Charter, but that:
Each judge shall hold his office until the place be declared
vacant by a resolution of the general assembly to that ef-
244. R.I. CONST. art. III; art. IV, §§ 1, 2, 10; art. X, § 1 (Proposed 1842), re-
printed in 2 POTTER, supra note 239. These provisions were adopted by the
Convention assembled at Newport. See POTTER, supra note 239.
245. See supra notes 239, 241 and accompanying text.
246. Kevin D. Leitao, Rhode Island's Forgotten Bill of Rights, 1 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 31, 58 (1996).
247. Id.
248. G. & D. Taylor & Co. v. Place, 4 R.I. 324, 352 (1856).
249. Id. at 353.
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fect; which resolution shall be voted for by a majority of
all members elected to the house in which it may origi-
nate, and be concurred in by the same majority of the
other house. Such a resolution shall not be entertained at
any other than the annual session for the election of pub-
lic officers; and in default of the passage thereof at said
session, the judge shall hold his place as is herein pro-
vided. 250
In addition, section 6 provided that the compensation of the
judges of the supreme court could not be diminished during their
continuance in office. 251 While the General Assembly still retained
the right to elect and "un-elect" supreme court justices, the em-
phasis was subtly changed from determining year to year whether
they should continue in office, to determining, in some year,
whether they should be removed from their judicial offices. Laud-
ing this constitutional change, Chief Justice Ames later wrote:
The plain import of all this, when compared,.., with the
state of things it was intended to remedy, is, that the
people of the state, when they adopted this constitution,
desired to have, in their court of last resort, so far as such
better constitutional provision would enable it, an edu-
cated and independent judiciary, with a comparatively
stable tenure of office, ....252
The text had, however, left open the question of whether the
principle of separation of powers and the vesting of judicial power
in the supreme court deprived the General Assembly of the judi-
cial power it had exercised under the Charter. There is evidence
the General Assembly thought it did not. The first digest of laws
enacted after the constitution became effective, the General Laws
of 1844, contained an act modernizing the method of petitioning
the General Assembly for review of decisions of the court.25 3 It is
evident that the General Assembly was preparing to continue its
pre-constitutional position as the state's ultimate appellate au-
250. In re Opinion of Judges, 51 A.2d 221, 221 (R.I 1902); see also Place, 4
R.I. at 346; R.I. CONST. art. X, § 4.
251. See Gorham v. Robinson, 186 A. 832, 843 (R.I. 1936); see also R.I.
CONST. art. X, § 6.
252. Place, 4 R.I. at 353.
253. Conley, supra note 232, at 10.
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thority.
As we shall see, however, the state's supreme court viewed
the new constitutional order, and in particular the new relation-
ship between the judiciary and the legislators, quite differently.
The tension between the command of separation of powers - with
the judicial power being in the supreme court and the General As-
sembly's view that it could continue to fully exercise judicial ap-
pellate power - soon began its path to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court. In 1854, the General Assembly ordered a new trial for gar-
nishees of a company indebted to another firm; prior to this order,
the courts had rejected a claim for a new trial.254 This exercise of
judicial power by the General Assembly was then challenged un-
der the new constitution.2 5 The court's subsequent interpretation
of the document's separation of powers, in a decision authored by
Chief Justice Ames in G. & D. Taylor & Co. v. Place,256 fundamen-
tally altered the constitutional arrangement of judicial and legis-
lative roles. The G. & D. Taylor & Co. court held that the General
Assembly's action constituted the exercise of judicial power,257 and
that the distribution of powers in Rhode Island
was, in our constitution, made for the special purpose. of
depriving the general assembly of their long exercised ju-
dicial power, which, rightly or wrongly, that body had as-
sumed under the charter.... It was the assumption of
judicial power by the general assembly, which must have
been specially aimed at by this clause of distribu-
tion .... 258
Chief Justice Ames asserted that "[a]n independent, responsi-
ble judiciary is the only safeguard of our property, lives, and liber-
ties."259 He emphatically recognized the role of the court in
preserving the liberties of Rhode Island citizens from the actions
of the state government, including actions of the legislative
branch. Moreover, as historian Patrick T. Conley has written,
"[t]he legislature acquiesced in this bold decision in 1857, when its
254. Place, 4 R.I. at 324-25.
255. See id. at 324.
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. Id. at 348-52 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
259. Id. at 343.
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new digest of general laws revised the petition process to exclude
the traditional review of court cases."260 Thus, the separation of
powers and independence of the judiciary were imbued with a sig-
nificantly stronger character in the constitutional scheme.
After sixty-seven years with no individual liberties or rights
protecting them from the actions of their state government, save
what the General Assembly would approve of giving them for as
long as it deemed appropriate, the citizens of Rhode Island created
a constitution describing rights they deemed fundamental, defin-
ing the limits of their state government's ability to interfere in
those areas of personal liberty, and providing for the power and
obligation of the Rhode Island Supreme Court to be the primary
guardian of those rights. In this regard, the 1842 Rhode Island
Constitution represented a "massive rethinking" of the principal
means of protecting the liberties of the state's citizens, 261 and cre-
ated a stronger and less dependent state supreme court as the
guardian of those liberties to protect them from infringement by
state government. 262
D. Post-Civil War Development
Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868,
the United States Supreme Court had acknowledged that the fed-
eral Bill of Rights did not protect against state action, but that
[e]ach state [has] established a constitution for itself, and,
in that constitution, provided such limitations and re-
strictions on the powers of its particular government as
its judgment dictated .... In their several constitutions
[the states] have imposed restrictions on their respective
governments as their own wisdom suggested; such as
they deemed most proper for themselves. It is a subject on
which they judge exclusively .... 263
Consequently, state supreme courts were acknowledged to be the
primary guarantors of individual rights and civil liberties against
260. Conley, supra note 232, at 10 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
261. Wood, supra note 172, at 1436.
262. See id.
263. Holland, supra note 159, at 997-98 (quoting Barron v. Baltimore, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247-48 (1833)).
20051
664 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol.10:621
state infringement.264 State court interpretations of constitutional
liberties even served as models for later U.S. Supreme Court in-
terpretations of the federal Constitution, "shap[ing] federal law in
the areas of judicial review, substantive due process, freedom of
speech, religion, eminent domain, the right to bear arms, and the
rights of the accused."265
The enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 added
an additional measure of protection from state government action.
As discussed earlier, by using the Amendment's Due Process
Clause,266 the Supreme Court began to apply selected provisions of
the federal Bill of Rights against state action.267 It was a gradual
process, taking "another hundred years and much disputed rea-
soning to equate most of the first eight amendments with due
process under the [F]ourteenth."268 Even then, the federal consti-
tutional standards established only a minimum level of protection,
protecting citizens only when their state constitutions and state
supreme courts did not already do so.
However, as the U.S. Supreme Court increasingly weighed in
on issues of individual rights and liberties, lawyers and state su-
preme courts tended to rely on Supreme Court decisions address-
ing federal constitutional rights provisions when addressing
analogous state constitutional rights in state proceedings, leading
to a federalization of constitutional rights. This was perhaps due
to what Wisconsin Justice Shirley Abrahamson has described as
"an understandable human tendency on the part of state
judges to view a Supreme Court decision on a particular
topic as the absolute, final truth.". . . "It is easier for
state judges and for lawyers to go along with the United
264. Id. at 998.
265. Id. (citing Honorable Robert F. Utter & Sanford E. Pitter, Presenting
a State Constitutional Argument: Comment on Theory and Technique, 20 IND.
L. REv. 635, 641 (1987)).
266. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
267. Holland, supra note 159, at 1002. Prior to the enactment of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the federal Bill of Rights was seen as protecting individ-
ual rights "solely against encroachment by the federal government." Id.However, after the Amendment was passed, "the United States SupremeCourt began to hold that selected provisions of the Federal Bill of Rights also
afforded protection against state action," pursuant to a process known as the
"incorporation doctrine." Id.
268. Linde, supra note 13, at 174.
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States Supreme Court than to strike out on their own to
analyze the state constitution. 2
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Stated another way, "j]udges are accustomed to thinking in a hi-
erarchical way, and the United States Supreme Court is at the top
of the ladder."270 This focus on Supreme Court constitutional deci-
sions did not invalidate state constitutional guarantees; it just left
them unattended, effectively leaving the Supreme Court as the
primary interpreter and guardian of fundamental liberties instead
of state supreme courts, contrary to the general understanding of
a significant portion of this nation's history.
When Rhode Island's citizens adopted a state constitution in
1842, thereby enacting state constitutional protections to be inter-
preted and applied by the Rhode Island Supreme Court, did they
expect or intend that their state constitutional rights would be
federalized? That is, did they expect or intend that the state con-
stitution would be effectively interpreted and applied by the U.S
Supreme Court rather than the state supreme court? In all likeli-
hood, the Rhode Island citizens who adopted the state constitution
did not expect or intend this result. Furthermore, even if the 1842
state constitution could be so construed, the Rhode Island Consti-
tution in its present form cannot be construed to confer upon the
U.S. Supreme Court the authority to define and declare the rights
arising under the state constitution. That authority is given to one
body only: the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
The 1986 Rhode Island Constitutional Convention amended
the state constitution to add a provision asserting the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court's role as the primary guardian of the funda-
mental liberties it declared.27 1 Article I's "Declaration of Certain
Constitutional Rights and Principles" was amended to conclude
with the following statement of intent: "'The rights guaranteed by
this [Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the
Constitution of the United States."'272 While in the process of pass-
ing this amendment, the framers of the amendment, which ulti-
269. Id. at 177 (quoting Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State
Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951, 964 (1982)).
270. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Divided We Stand: State Constitutions in a
More Perfect Union, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 723, 732 (1990).
271. See Robert H. Whorf, "Coervive Ambiguity" In the Routine Traffic
Stop Turned Consent Search, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 379, 402-03 (1997).
272. Id. at 402-03 (quoting R.I. CONST. art. I, § 24) (emphasis added).
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mately became section 24 of article I of the Rhode Island Constitu-
tion,273 recognized evidence that the
U.S. Supreme Court ha[d], in recent years, moved to a
narrower application of individual rights and that some
other state courts... [were] taking a more expansive in-
terpretation of individual rights under state constitutions
than under the Bill of Rights and the [Fourteenth]
Amendment... [and that] the rights of the individual...
whether enumerated in the [state cionstitution or based
on prior rights exercised by the people, are guaranteed
irrespective of the U.S. Constitutional protection.27 4
Section 24 is an implicit recognition of a new judicial federal-
ism, and of the primacy approach to state constitutionalism in
particular. The section affirmed that Rhode Island's state consti-
tutional guarantees were meant, as Justice Linde has described,
to "remain genuine guarantees against misuse of the state's gov-
ernmental powers, truly independent of the rising and falling
tides of federal case law both in method and in specifics."275 It
placed the constitutional obligation on the Rhode Island Supreme
Court to resist any inclination to uncritically and deferentially
cede its responsibility to uphold state constitutional guarantees to
the United States Supreme Court, and constituted a foundational
statement declaring that the people of Rhode Island declined to
entrust their constitutional rights entirely to the federal courts. It
was a significant constitutional marker, obliging the state su-
preme court to exercise its full rights and responsibilities under
federalism as the primary guardian of state constitutional rights
and liberties, and to critically interpret their proper meaning and
scope.
At about the same time that Rhode Island citizens were
amending the state constitution to embrace the primacy approach
to state constitutionalism, the Rhode Island Supreme Court issued
an opinion that was as resounding a declaration of judicial inde-
pendence as Chief Justice Ames's decision in G. & D. Taylor &
273. See id.; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 24.
274. Whorf, supra note 271, at 403 (internal quotations omitted) (empha-
sis added).
275. State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1323 (Or. 1983).
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Co. 276 was - if not more so. In a nonbinding advisory opinion, three
justices of the Rhode Island Supreme Court opined that the Gen-
eral Assembly no longer had the constitutional authority to re-
move a justice by a majority vote of both the House and Senate in
grand committee, and that a justice could only be removed by the
impeachment process. 277 According to the opinion, that power had
been repealed by implication most probably in 1854, but certainly
by 1893.278 These justices offered the following rationale for their
decision:
The power of the Legislature to remove Supreme Court
justices by joint resolution was limited from the very be-
ginning, conditioned specifically on the occurrence of a
legislative session that met annually for the election of
public officers. With the effective abolition of that session
in 1854, and more certainly in 1893, there was and is no
longer any constitutionally ordained forum in which this
power can be exercised.
279
They believed that article X, section 4, as set forth in the state
constitution in 1842, made the timing of the exercise of the power
of removal "vital to the power itself,"280 and that when the consti-
tution was amended to eliminate the described "time and occasion
for the exercise of the power, [the power itselfl ceased to exist."
281
They construed the constitution to permit the removal of a Rhode
Island Supreme Court justice only through the constitutionally
prescribed process of impeachment.
282
Although the issue addressed by the justices' advisory opinion
was never adjudicated in a litigated case, a 1994 constitutional
amendment was approved that eliminated the removal language
set forth in article X and replaced it with the single sentence that
implicitly approved the advisory opinion and the desirability of a
truly independent judiciary. 28 3 The amendment stated that "Jus-
276. 4 R.I. 324 (1856); see also discussion supra Part IV.B.
277. In re Advisory Opinion (Chief Justice), 507 A.2d 1316, 1320, 1327
(R.I. 1986).




282. Id. at 1327.
283. See Burton P. Jenks, III, Rhode Island's New Judicial Merit Selection
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tices of the Supreme Court shall hold office during good behav-
ior,"284 giving Rhode Island Supreme Court justices life tenure
subject only to impeachment. The justices' newly confirmed inde-
pendence was a significant and substantial enhancement of its
role vis-a-vis the legislature as the guardian of the liberties, privi-
leges and protections set forth in the Rhode Island Constitution,just as article I, section 24 was a command for a significant and
substantial enhancement of its role in interpreting and protecting
those liberties vis-A-vis the United States Supreme Court.
Through their constitution, Rhode Islanders sent a strong mes-
sage concerning the role they expected their state supreme court
to play as guardian of their constitutional liberties, whether
analogous rights appeared in the federal Constitution or not. The
question is whether the court has met that expectation.
IV. ARTICLE I RIGHTS: INDEPENDENT VITALITY OR Row OF SHADOWS?
Although the Rhode Island Supreme Court has never cited ar-
ticle I, section 24, it has recognized that "our constitution was
made by Rhode Islanders for a Rhode Island government,"2 5 and
that "'state charters ... were conceived as the first and at one
time the only line of protection of the individual against the ex-
cesses of local officials."286 It has also consistently acknowledged
that the state and federal constitutions provide a "double-
barreled" source of protection, 2 7 and that a state court is free to
adopt stronger constitutional protections under the state constitu-
tion than the U.S. Supreme Court might adopt under the federal
Constitution,288 even when the text of the documents is similar or
Law, 1 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 63, 64 n.8 (1996).
284. Id. (quoting R.I. CONST. art. X, § 5).285. In re Advisory Opinion to the Senate, 278 A.2d 852, 854-55 (R.I.
1971).
286. State v. Benoit, 417 A.2d 895, 899 (R.I. 1980) (quoting People v. Bris-
endine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113 (Cal. 1975)).287. See, e.g., Pimental v. Dep't of Transp., 561 A.2d 1348, 1350 (R.I.1989); State v. von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995, 1019 (R.I. 1986); State v. Sitko, 460A.2d 1, 2 (R.I. 1983); State v. Luther, 351 A.2d 594, 594 (R.I. 1976); State v.
Maloof, 333 A.2d 676, 681 (R.I. 1975).288. See, e.g., Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 869 n.20 (R.I. 1997);State v. Bjerke, 697 A.2d 1069, 1073 (R.I. 1997); R.I. Grand Jury v. Doe, 641A.2d 1295, 1296 (R.I. 1994); State v. Werner, 615 A.2d 1010, 1012 (R.I. 1992);State v. Bertram, 591 A.2d 14, 21 (R.I. 1991); Town of Barrington v. Blake,568 A.2d 1015, 1018 (R.I. 1990); Pimental, 561 A.2d at 1350; von Bulow, 475
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identical. 28 9 The Rhode Island Supreme Court has also frequently
taken notice of article I's preamble by declaring that the court has
a "paramount obligation" to maintain and preserve the fundamen-
tal rights set forth in that article.
290
The affirmation that article I rights are "fundamental,"
291
"paramount,"292 and "made by Rhode Islanders for a Rhode Island
government" 293 could reasonably lead one to conclude that the
Rhode Island Supreme Court applies the primacy approach when
constitutional claims are made under both the state and federal
constitutions. One might reasonably conclude that the court would
be inclined to look first to the state constitution to determine what
the Rhode Island framers intended by the words chosen to protect
them against infringement of their liberties. Additionally, in light
of the 1986 amendment adding section 24 to article I, it would be
reasonable to conclude that the court would critically examine the
U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of analogous rights, inde-
pendently explore and define the contours of the protections
adopted in the state constitution, and determine the most appro-
priate tests to describe and protect those rights. One could rea-
sonably conclude these things; but one would be wrong.
Instead, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has consistently
addressed the federal Constitution first, interpreting and deter-
mining the federal constitutional right before the state right is
addressed. When it does address the state constitutional question,
it has deferred to the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the
analogous right under the federal Constitution, adopting it as the
appropriate one for the Rhode Island Constitution as well. The
constitutional rights in article I have become, consequently, more
shadow than substance.
A.2d at 1019; Duquette v. Godbout, 471 A.2d 1359, 1361 (R.I. 1984); Sitko,
460 A.2d at 2-3; Benoit, 417 A.2d at 899; Maloof, 333 A.2d at 681.
289. See, e.g., Pontbriand, 699 A.2d at 869; Pimental, 561 A.2d at 1350.
290. Sitko, 460 A.2d at 3; Maloof, 333 A.2d at 678; see also Bandoni v.
State, 715 A.2d 580, 614 (R.I. 1998) (referring to the preamble and calling the
Rhode Island Constitution's Declaration of Rights "the repository of Rhode
Islanders' fundamental rights.").
291. Bandoni, 715 A.2d at 614.
292. Sitko, 460 A.2d at 3; Maloof, 333 A.2d at 678.
293. In re Advisory Opinion to the Senate, 278 A.2d 852, 854-55 (R.I.
1971).
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A. The Rhode Island Supreme Court's Lockstep Approach to State
Constitutionalism
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has shown a marked disin-
clination to give the state's Declaration of Rights any meaning
apart from that given to the analogous rights of the federal Bill of
Rights by the U.S. Supreme Court or, more importantly, to criti-
cally examine the federal interpretation of those constitutional
protections. The court has repeatedly declared that "[t]he decision
to depart from [the] minimum standards [of the federal Constitu-
tion] and to increase the level of protection [under the state consti-
tution] should be made guardedly and should be supported by
principled rationale.294 For example, in the context of claims of
unreasonable searches and seizures, the court has said that the
manner in which the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the pro-
tections of the Fourth Amendment should "command respect 295
and should "receive great deference,296 by state courts when in-
terpreting their own state constitutional document. Presumably,
this deference is due to the court's view of federalism, and the
proper relationship that it believes it should assume with the U.S.
Supreme Court, although the court does not explain why this def-
erence is necessary.
In terms of state constitutionalism, the succinct rule adopted
by the court reflects, in form, the "supplemental approach" to state
constitutional interpretation.297 In actual substance, however, the
court's approach is even more deferential than the supplemental
approach; it reflects a "lockstep approach" with United States Su-
preme Court decisions that interpret parallel provisions of the
federal Constitution. 298 In fact, the more recent Rhode Island Su-
294. State v. Benoit, 417 A.2d 895, 899 (R.I. 1980); see also State v. Bjerke,697 A.2d 1069, 1073 (R.I. 1997) (quoting the same language from Benoit, 417A.2d at 899); In re Advisory to the Governor, 666 A.2d 813, 816 (R.I. 1995)(same); State v. Werner, 615 A.2d 1010, 1014 (R.I. 1992) (same); Pimental,561 A.2d at 1350-51 (quoting similar language); Duquette v. Godbout, 471A.2d 1359, 1361 (R.I. 1984) (same).
295. Benoit, 417 A.2d at 899.
296. Pimental, 561 A.2d at 1350.
297. See discussion supra Part III.A-B.
298. See Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitu-
tional Law, 84 VA. L. REV. 389, 421-24 (1998) (explaining the "lockstep ap-proach" to state constitutionalism and highlighting its strengths and
weaknesses).
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preme Court cases involving parallel federal and state constitu-
tional claims demonstrate an aversion to even investigating
whether greater protection should be warranted under the state
constitution. For example, in Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 299 where the
court addressed the right to privacy under the federal and state
constitutions, the court declared in a footnote that "[a]lthough this
court has the power and the right to effectuate a higher level of
constitutional safeguards for Rhode Island citizens under our own
constitutional provisions than provided by the United States Con-
stitution, we shall not reach such contention absent strict neces-
sity."300 The court left unsaid what would constitute the necessity
sufficient to persuade it to even reach and consider a claim that
the state constitution does, or should, provide greater protection
than the federal Constitution. The court found that there was no
such necessity in Pontbriand, notwithstanding the fact that the
federal Constitution did not provide any constitutional relief, and
that a state constitutional claim was contemporaneously as-
serted.30' Implicit in the Pontbriand court's statement is a state
constitutional policy that the court will follow the U.S. Supreme
Court's interpretation of the federal Constitution unless there is a
strict necessity to depart from it.302 Whatever "strict necessity"
may mean, it does not suggest a practice of critical and searching
evaluation of state constitutional doctrine.
Even when the court has granted greater protection, it has
later reversed itself. For instance, in considering the exigency ex-
ception to the warrant requirement for searches and seizures in
State v. Benoit,30 3 the court first elected to follow the rationale of
the dissent in the leading United States Supreme Court decision
on the issue, rather than following the majority opinion, thereby
granting greater protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures than in the federal context. 304 Twelve years later, how-
ever, in State v. Werner,305 the court reversed its decision in Benoit
299. 699 A.2d 856 (R.I. 1997).
300. Id. at 869 n.20 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
301. See id. at 869, 869 n.20.
302. See id. at 869 n.20 ("[Wie shall not reach such contentions [that the
state constitution offers higher protections than the federal Constitution] ab-
sent strict necessity.").
303. 417 A.2d 895 (R.I. 1980).
304. Id. at 899-00.
305. 615 A.2d 1010, 1013 (R.I. 1992).
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on the grounds that federal case law that guided the court's origi-
nal departure from the federal precedent had been "stabilized by
the Supreme Court."306 The court decided to "eliminate the con-
flicting interpretations" of the state and federal constitutions "[i]n
light of the Supreme Court's clarification of the exigency issue."30 7
Another example is State v. Holliday,3 8 where the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court found that the right to counsel issue before it
had not been addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court, 30 9 and went
on to decide whether relief was available under the state constitu-
tion.310 It resolved the state constitutional issue, however, simply
by stating that it "[did] not perceive" that the federal constitu-
tional requirements of the Sixth Amendment were "any more rig-
orous" than the state constitutional requirements for the right to
counsel, 311 and predicted that the defendant would be entitled to
the requested relief under the federal Constitution and that there-
fore the defendant was entitled to such relief under the state con-
stitution.312 Twenty-four years later, however, in In re Advisory
Opinion to the Governor,313 the court declared that Holliday was
decided without "precise guidance from the United States Su-
preme Court,"314 and that its "prognostication ... was inaccu-
rate."315 Consequently, "considerations of public policy motivate[d]
[the court] to conform [its] reading" of the state constitution to the
United States Supreme Court's reading of the federal Constitu-
tion.3' 6
These examples demonstrate that the court unequivocally
views Supreme Court decisions concerning analogous constitu-
tional provisions as: 1) presumptively correct readings of the fed-
eral Constitution; and 2) presumptively correct interpretations of
the Rhode Island Constitution, notwithstanding the disparate ori-
gins, drafters and even eras of enactment. The court's approach to
306. Id. at 1013.
307. Id. at 1014.
308. 280 A.2d 333 (R.I. 1971).
309. Id. at 335.
310. See id. at 336.
311. See id.
312. Id.
313. 666 A.2d 813 (R.I. 1995).
314. Id. at 816.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 817.
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state constitutionalism reflects a lockstep, hierarchical view of
constitutional jurisprudence that is at odds with article I, section
24 of the Rhode Island Constitution, does not take full advantage
of the opportunities presented by the principles of federalism, and,
it is respectfully submitted, does not fully meet a state supreme
court's obligations under federalism or its own state constitution.
Nor does the court's approach fit comfortably with its own re-
peated assertion that its object in construing the Rhode Island
Constitution is to effectuate the intent of its framers.317 None of
the decisions stating the "guarded and principled" departure rule
- allowing departure only when there is "strict necessity" - have
demonstrated that the framers of the 1842 state constitution were
content to enact a Declaration of Rights that was either identical
or merely coextensive with the federal Bill of Rights. 318 Nor have
any of the court's post-19 8 6 decisions stating the rule demon-
strated that the framers of the 1986 state constitutional amend-
ment had any such intent either. 319 In fact, the enactment of
section 24 can only fairly be interpreted as demonstrating that the
1986 framers had exactly the opposite intent: to encourage inde-
pendent evaluation of state constitutional issues. Rather, the
"guarded and principled" rule seems to simply reflect the court's
unexplained preference for a limited and highly deferential view of
its perceived relationship with the U.S. Supreme Court when it
comes to exploring and deciding constitutional questions - even
state constitutional questions - and its reluctance to fully utilize
its sovereign constitutional authority under the principles of judi-
cial federalism.
A court engaging in "lockstep interpretation" ostensibly is en-
gaging in a form of state constitutional interpretation because it
"necessarily entails a conclusion about the meaning of the state
constitution: The state provision means what the federal analogue
317. See, e.g., Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1038 (R.I. 2004); City of
Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 45 (R.I. 1995); Kleczek v. R.I.
Interscholastic League, Inc., 612 A.2d 734, 739 (R.I. 1992); In re Advisory
Opinion to the Governor (Ethics Commission), 612 A.2d 1, 7 (R.I. 1992); State
v. Cianci, 591 A.2d 1193, 1201 (R.I. 1991).
318. See, e.g., Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 869 & n.20 (R.I.
1997); State v. Benoit, 417 A.2d 895, 899 (R.I. 1980).
319. See, e.g., State v. Bjerke, 697 A.2d 1069, 1073 (R.I. 1997); In re Advi-
sory to the Governor, 666 A.2d 813, 816 (R.I. 1995); State v. Werner, 615 A.2d
1010, 1014 (R.I. 1992); Pimental, 561 A.2d at 1350-51.
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means."320 Lockstep interpretation does not typically involve an
investigation into whether the state constitution was intended to
mean the same as the federal Constitution.321 Instead, the ap-
proach involves a decision by the state supreme court that a par-
ticular interpretation is what the state constitution should mean
in relation to the federal Constitution. "Lockstep interpretation re-
flects a belief in the primacy of the [federal] Constitution in mat-
ters affecting individual rights,"322 and it "invokes [and defers to]
the interpretive expertise of the federal courts."323 One commenta-
tor has observed that the lockstep approach affords the maximum
possible deference to state actors because it "eliminates the state
constitution as an independent restriction on state governmental
activity,"324 "embodies a deferential application of judicial re-
view,"325 and "allows a [state] court to avoid the potentially con-
troversial task of determining that a government action, though
valid under the [federal] Constitution, nevertheless violates the
state charter."326
The first fundamental problem with a lockstep approach is its
"assumption that the state constitution does not merit independ-
ent [investigation],"327 whether it be investigation of the text and
history, or whether it be a critical investigation of competing
strains of constitutional thought regarding a particular liberty or
protection found in both the state and federal constitutions. This
assumption has been described as "an unwarranted abdication of
a court's interpretive duty,"328 and, even worse, as "an extreme
case of judicial self-abnegation."329 Moreover, making such an as-
sumption is unmistakably inconsistent with the constitutional di-
rective of article I, section 24 of the Rhode Island Constitution.330
Another drawback to the lockstep approach taken by the
320. Schapiro, supra note 297, at 422.
321. See id. at 421-22.
322. Id. at 424.
323. Id. at 422.
324. Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in
State and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 656, 693 (2000).
325. Id.
326. Schapiro, supra note 298, at 421.
327. Robert A. Schapiro, Contingency and Universalism ia State Separa-
tion of Powers Discourse, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 79, 86-87 (1998).
328. Id. at 87.
329. Schapiro, supra note 297, at 422.
330. See R.I. CONST. art. I, § 24.
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Rhode Island Supreme Court is that it causes the court to go for-
ward in deciding an issue of federal constitutional law, which is
sometimes settled and sometimes not, when the case may be de-
cided on state constitutional grounds instead. Although the court
routinely follows the rule that it will not decide a constitutional
matter when there is another non-constitutional state ground on
which the matter can be decided, 331 the court has recently reaf-
firmed that, where the contention is between state and federal
constitutional law, it "'.will refrain from passing on a constitutional
question when it is clear that the case before [it] can be decided on
another point and that a determination of such a question is not
indispensably necessary for a disposition of the case."'3 3 2 The same
principle of judicial restraint ought to apply to cases where a foray
into federal constitutional law is not indispensably necessary for a
disposition of the case because a determination under the state
constitution would make such an exercise unnecessary. The court
should not declare federal constitutional rights when a declaration
of state constitutional rights could resolve the dispute. It should
fully address the state constitutional responsibilities and obliga-
tions that are its exclusive charge, and only decide the case on
federal constitutional grounds if the state constitution does not
provide relief.
An additional shortcoming of the lockstep approach is that the
way in which the Rhode Island Supreme Court chooses to defer to
federal constitutional decisions invites federal judicial review. A
state court decision that addresses and expounds upon questions
of federal constitutional law is subject to review by the U.S. Su-
preme Court unless "'the decision of [the state] court rests on a
state law ground that is independent of the federal question and
adequate to support the judgment.'"3 3 "[A]dequacy 'is itself a fed-
eral question'" that the U.S. Supreme Court decides. 334 Where a
state supreme court has stated that it will apply the "same analy-
sis" to a state constitutional claim as is applied to a parallel fed-
331. See, e.g., Dahl v. Begin, 660 A.2d 730, 732 (R.I. 1995); Town of Bar-
rington v. Blake, 532 A.2d 955, 955 (R.I. 1987).
332. Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1038 (R.I. 2004) (quoting McElroy v.
Hawksley, 196 A.2d 172, 176 (R.I. 1963)).
333. Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375 (2002) (quoting Coleman v. Thomp-
son, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991)).
334. Id. (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 422 (1965)).
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eral constitutional claim, or that the federal and state constitu-
tional protections are "identical," the Supreme Court considers the
state court decision to rest sufficiently upon federal grounds to
support jurisdiction.335
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has tended to describe the
scope of state constitutional protections by using terms danger-
ously similar to "same analysis" and "identical," thereby increas-
ing the likelihood that the U.S. Supreme Court would consider
these state decisions as resting sufficiently upon federal grounds
to support federal jurisdiction for review. For example, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court has determined that the right to equal pro-
tection under article I, section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution
is "on par with,"336 "similar to,"337 and "coextensive" with the par-
allel right in the federal Constitution;338 the right to the privilege
against self-incrimination under article I, section 13 is "tanta-
mount to" and "coextensive with" the federal right;339 that the pro-
tection against unreasonable searches and seizures in article I,
section 6 is generally "identical to the Fourth Amendment;"340 that
the right to religious freedom under article I, section 3 is "no more
restrictive" of the government than the religious rights under the
First Amendment;341 that the right of privacy under the state con-
stitution is identical in scope to the right under the federal Consti-
tution;342 that the free speech provisions of article I, section 21 do
not "afford[ I more extensive protection.., than the United States
Constitution presently affords;" 343 and that the same three-
335. See Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 106
(2003).
336. Kleczek v. R.I. Interscholastic League, Inc., 612 A.2d 734, 738 (R.I.
1992).
337. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 659 A.2d 95, 100 (R.I. 1995).
338. In re Jeramie N., 688 A.2d 823, 828 (R.I. 1997). Compare R.I. CONST.
art. I, § 2, with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
339. R.I. Grand Jury v. Doe, 641 A.2d 1295, 1297 (R.I. 1994) ("coextensive
with"); State v. Bertram, 591 A.2d 14, 21 (R.I. 1991) ("tantamount to"). Com-
pare R.I. CONST. art. I, § 13, with U.S. CONST. amend. V.
340. State v. Taylor, 621 A.2d 1252, 1254 (R.I. 1993). Compare R.I..CONST.
art. I, § 6, with U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
341. In re Palmer, 386 A.2d 1112, 1114 n.1 (R.I. 1978). Compare R.I.
CONST. art. I, § 3, with U.S. CONST. amend. I.
342. Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 869 (R.I. 1997) ("[W~e shall
treat the constitutional protections afforded by the Federal and State Consti-
tutions as being of identical scope.").
343. Town of Barrington v. Blake, 568 A.2d 1015, 1018 (R.I. 1990). Com-
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pronged test employed by the U.S. Supreme Court to the prohibi-
tion of impairment of contracts under the federal Constitution also
applies to the impairment of contractual language under article I,
section 12 of the state constitution.344 As a consequence, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court decisions with respect to each of these state
constitutional rights is subject to the review, interpretation and
final authority of the U.S. Supreme Court. Thus, it is not the
Rhode Island Supreme Court that is ultimately the final arbiter
on Rhode Island constitutional meaning; it is the United States
Supreme Court.
B. The Rhode Island Supreme Court's Obligation and
Responsibility for a More Vigorous Approach to State
Constitutionalism
By asserting that the state constitutional right is identical,
tantamount to, or coextensive with the federal right, the state su-
preme court is arguably committing itself to the proposition that it
will follow the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal
Constitution when a parallel state constitutional right is at issue
no matter what constitutional path a majority of that court wishes
to travel. Describing state constitutional rights in that way not
only creates a potential extra layer of review for the litigants, but
it effectively transfers the final interpretive authority for the state
constitution from the Rhode Island Supreme Court to the U.S. Su-
preme Court. It is respectfully submitted that the court has an ob-
ligation and responsibility to take a more active, vigorous and
independent approach to interpreting and applying state constitu-
tional provisions, notwithstanding the fact that the state constitu-
tion may have federal analogs that the U.S. Supreme Court has
previously interpreted.
If the Rhode Island Supreme Court independently determines
that a state constitutional provision is to be interpreted in the
same manner and breadth as an analogous federal constitutional
provision in a given case, that is its prerogative. However, it must
make clear that it is simply agreeing with the federal interpreta-
pare R.I. CONST. art. I, § 21, with U.S. CONST. amend. I.
344. See, e.g., R.I. Insurers' Insolvency Fund v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 716 A.2d
730, 736 (R.I. 1998). Compare R.I. CONST. art. I, § 12, with U.S. CONST. art. I.,
§ 10, cl. 1.
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tion as the best interpretation as to the extent of the state right at
issue, and thus is gleaning from the federal interpretation what
the state constitution likely means rather than simply adopting
the federal rule of law without further analysis. The court must
state that it is deciding the case on an adequate and independent
state ground to avoid permitting its own interpretive authority to
be supplanted by the U.S. Supreme Court.345
The court should determine state constitutional claims before
federal ones when both are raised, and decline to reach the federal
constitutional issue when the state constitution affords the relief
requested. 346 Even if the court elects to continue to address federal
constitutional claims first, when the federal Constitution does not
provide relief and a state constitutional claim has been raised, the
court must vigorously explore the state constitution to determine
if it is, or if it should be, more protective of the particular right at
issue, and whether it can supply the relief requested by the liti-
gant. This process necessarily entails a full state constitutional
analysis. Where the state constitutional provision has its own
text, history or origin, it is the obligation of the court to explore
these factors, and to explain why it thinks that the state provision
says more or less than its federal counterpart. Furthermore, even
where the text of a Rhode Island constitutional provision is identi-
cal to its federal counterpart, and even where there is no sepa-
rately discernable clarifying history or origin, the court still has
an obligation to examine the reasoning, logic and analysis of a
U.S. Supreme Court majority opinion to determine its persuasive
345. The only case the author discovered in which the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court specifically indicated that state constitutional provision pro-
vided a "bona fide separate, adequate, and independent ground[]'" for its
decision is State v. von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995, 1019 (R.I. 1984) (quoting Michi-
gan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1033 (1983)). In that decision, the court first ad-
dressed the federal constitutional issues concerning the suppression of
evidence under the federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures. See id. at 1018-19. Even though
the court determined that the defendant was entitled to relief under the fed-
eral Constitution, it went on to say the defendant would have been entitled to
relief under article 1, section 6 of the Rhode Island Constitution even if the
Fourth Amendment did not protect him, and described that state law ground
as an adequate and independent ground for its decision. Id. at 1019; compare
R.I. CONST. art. I, § 6, with U.S. CONST. amend. IV. By doing so, the court
quashed any potential federal review of the decision, and the entire discus-
sion of the federal constitutional issue became dicta.
346. See discussion supra Part III.C-D.
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weight on the merits before adopting that rationale for the state
provision. In a five-to-four decision by the U.S. Supreme Court,
there are almost an equal number of justices who disagree with
the majority's reasoning, logic and analysis - presumably finding
it unpersuasive - as there are justices agreeing with the majority's
disposition. Moreover, prior federal circuit courts of appeals' deci-
sions, as well as state supreme court decisions, both before and af-
ter the five-to-four decision may also reject the reasoning, logic
and analysis of that five-to-four decision. It is incumbent on the
Rhode Island Supreme Court to evaluate the persuasiveness of
those dissenting views, to reach its own conclusion as to the mer-
its and desirability of the Supreme Court majority decision in or-
der to protect the fundamental liberties of this state's citizenry,
and to add its own voice and considered opinion to the national
constitutional debate. That is its right and obligation under the
principles of federalism and the Rhode Island Constitution. The
Rhode Island Supreme Court has been charged by the people of
this state, through the state constitution, "to say what [the] law is,
to be the guardian of our constitutional rights, and to uphold [the
state constitution's] paramount provisions in all judicial proceed-
ings."347
An example of the importance of a more vigorous approach to
state constitutionalism is illustrated by the current state of juris-
prudence with respect to the free exercise of religion. In 1968, in
one sentence of a per curiam decision in Bowerman v. O'Connor,3
8
the Rhode Island Supreme Court offered its analysis of the state
constitution's religion clause, embodied in article I, section 3, stat-
ing: "Nor can we agree with appellees that the language of the
constitution of this state prohibiting establishment of religion or
the interference with the free exercise thereof is more restrictive
than the language of the federal [Clonstitution. .. -349 While
Bowerman was an Establishment Clause case, ten years later in
In re Palmer,350 a Free Exercise Clause case, the court reiterated
its bare conclusion "that the language of article [I], section 3 of the
Rhode Island Constitution is no more restrictive as to religious
347. Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580, 602 (R.I. 1990) (Flanders, J., dissent-
ing).
348. 247 A.2d 82 (1968).
349. Id. at 83; see also R.I. CONST. art. I, § 3.
350. 386 A.2d 1112 (R.I. 1978).
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freedoms than the language of the [federal] Constitution."3 5 At
that time, equating the two clauses was uncontroversial; it simply
meant that free exercise claims under the state constitution would
be decided under the same test used by the U.S. Supreme Court
under the federal Constitution, - namely the compelling state in-
terest test,352 which has been described as "the most demanding
test known to constitutional law."353
In 1990, however, in what Professor Michael W. McConnell
has described as "undoubtedly the most important development in
the law of religious freedom in decades,"354 the United States Su-
preme Court abandoned the compelling interest test for free exer-
cise claims under the First Amendment in a five-to-four decision
in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith.355 The Smith
decision has been heavily criticized by a number of Supreme Courtjustices, 356 commentators, 357 and state courts,358 who all appeared
to agree with Justice Sandra Day O'Connor that Smith "dramati-
cally depart[ed] from well-settled First Amendment jurispru-
dence,"359 and was "incompatible with our Nation's fundamental
commitment to individual religious liberty."360 Writing for the
Smith majority, Justice Antonin Scalia saw the Supreme Court's
free exercise jurisprudence quite differently, declaring that the
Court had "never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse
him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting con-
duct that the State is free to regulate."361 According to the major-
ity, "the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general appli-
351. Id. at 1114 n.1.
352. See id. at 1115.
353. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997).354. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith De-
cision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1990).
355. 494 U.S. 872, 876-90 (1990).
356. See, e.g., id. at 892 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (indicating that Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined in the relevant portion of her
concurrence).
357. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 354, at 1152-53.358. See, e.g., Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark County, 995 P.2d 33, 43-45 (Wash. 2000); State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 240-41 (Wis. 1996); Swan-
ner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 280-81 (Alaska 1994);Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 236 (Mass. 1994).
359. Smith, 494 U.S. at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
360. Id.
361. Id. at 878-79.
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cability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) con-
duct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).' 362 Under the
compelling interest test, however, the right of free exercise did
just that absent a compelling government interest outweighing
the individual's protected religious liberty.
As a result of Smith's clarification or correction of federal con-
stitutional law, the Rhode Island Supreme Court would be faced
with a choice in any future state constitutional free exercise claim:
follow the Supreme Court along its new path or give independent
effect to the state constitution's religion clause. There are signifi-
cant textual and historical markers to suggest that article I, sec-
tion 3 of the state constitution has always embodied an expansive
religious liberty best implemented by the compelling interest
test;3 63 but even if there were not, the court would still be obliged
to weigh the merits of competing views of the First Amendment as
found in the U.S. Supreme Court decisions themselves, and as
found in law reviews, journals and other state supreme court deci-
sions as well. It is obligated to do so to fully carry out its role in
giving meaning to the liberties protected by the state constitution,
and to be an active participant in the federalist model by adding
its views to the national debate over the strength and vigor of the
right to free exercise of religion. This is its obligation for every
claim properly and distinctly made under the state constitution.
364
362. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
363. See generally Thomas R. Bender, Dusting Off Article 1, Section 3: The
Possibility of Constitutionally Required Exemptions From Rhode Island Gen-
eral Laws, 53 R.I.B.J. 13 passim (2004).
364. The call presented here is not only to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court, however, because there is an indispensable component without which
the court cannot explore, analyze or expound upon the state constitution and
create a thoughtful body of state constitutional jurisprudence. As alluded to
earlier, that indispensable component is competent arguments by the Rhode
Island Bar compelling the court to analyze state constitutional claims inde-
pendent from federal constitutional jurisprudence. As Justice Souter wrote as
a member of the New Hampshire Supreme Court:
It is the need of every appellate court for the participation of the bar
in the process of trying to think sensibly and comprehensibly about
the questions that the judicial power has been established to answer.
Nowhere is the need greater than in the field of state constitutional
law, where we are asked so often to confront questions that have al-
ready been decided under the National Constitution. If we place too
much reliance on federal precedent we will render the State rules a
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CONCLUSION
"Checking arbitrary power and protecting our precious liber-
ties are the twin towers of constitutional adjudication, the quin-
tessence of constitutional law, and the most importantjurisprudential duties that [the] justices of the highest court in
this state can possibly perform.365 Utilizing the primacy approach
would ensure that the Rhode Island Supreme Court's state consti-
tutional adjudication takes full advantage of the genius of federal-
ism's "split[ting] the atom 'of sovereignty."366 The primacy
approach would also ensure that the Declaration of Rights in Arti-
cle 1 of the Rhode Island Constitution becomes the source of truly
independent fundamental rights of paramount importance, and
not simply "a mere row of shadows,"367 or, as one former Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court justice has described, a "smaller and less
meaningful... parchment pasquinade of its intended meaning."368
The primacy approach ensures that the Rhode Island Supreme
Court fulfills its obligation as the sole guardian and expositor of
state constitutional protections belonging to Rhode Islanders, and
stresses the importance of the state constitution as a statement of
the democratic principles and liberties Rhode Islanders believe in.
In 1842, the citizens of Rhode Island made a historic decision
to embed certain rights, liberties and privileges in a state consti-
tution to cabin the authority and activities of state government,
and to establish a sphere of personal individual liberty.369 At the
time there was no other document with this purpose. Those same
citizens restructured their state government to place the responsi-
bility for defining and enforcing the boundary between the indi-
mere row of shadows; if we place too little, we will render State prac-
tice incoherent. If we are going to steer between these extremes, we
will have to insist on developed advocacy from those who bring the
cases before us.
State v. Bradberry, 522 A.2d 1380, 1389 (N.H. 1986) (Souter, J., concurring).
365. Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1082 (R.I. 2004) (Flanders, J., dis-
senting).
366. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring).
367. Bradberry, 522 A.2d at 1389 (Souter, J., concurring).
368. Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580, 603 (R.I. 1998) (Flanders, J., dissent-
ing).
369. See discussion supra Part IV.
683STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM
vidual and the state in the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
37c That
the U.S. Supreme Court later began to interpret the federal Con-
stitution to establish minimum protections for citizens from their
state governments did not change the Rhode Island people's origi-
nal delegation of power and responsibility for the state constitu-
tion. That power and responsibility continued and continues to lie
with the Rhode Island Supreme Court. Both that power and the
genius of federalism is lost when a state court cedes its interpre-
tive responsibility for the state constitution to the U.S. Supreme
Court by uncritically following that Court's majority decisions.
The Rhode Island Constitution is a unique document enacted by a
unique people, evidencing the sovereignty permitted them in our
federalist system. Rhode Island judges and lawyers should begin
their dialogue about constitutional rights with its provisions, and
using their own ideas as well as the teachings and ideas of other
state and federal courts, give these provisions independent mean-
ing, presence and value. We should not leave it to others to decide
what our state constitution means and then struggle to divine the
meaning they have chosen. We should do it ourselves, for our-
selves.
"[SItate constitutions offer those.., who will argue and de-
cide constitutional cases the chance to question familiar formulas,
[and] to follow [their] own theories to a conclusion."
371 These
documents also "allow the people of each state to choose their own
theory of government and of law, within what the nation requires,
to take responsibility for their own liberties."
372 The challenge to
the bench and bar of this state is to thoughtfully and conscien-
tiously take advantage of these opportunities, and to undertake
that responsibility.
370. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
371. Linde, supra note 13, at 199.
372. Id.
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